# Multi-Layered Conflict
in the Greater Horn of Africa

Prepared for

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative,

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This document *Multi-layered Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa*, is a supplement to the report *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts A Guide for Practitioners* previously produced by Creative Associates International Inc That guide was requested by the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative to help support the Initiative s effort to promote peace and development in the Greater Horn of Africa This report was not done at the Initiative s request Hopefully the information contained herein will be useful to the Initiative and other interested parties

The information and observations contained in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States government

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I.   Summary

An in-depth understanding of the multiple layers of conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa is an obvious prerequisite for considering actions and policies aimed at preventing violent conflict A simple country-by-country description of conflict or its potential in the ten nations of the Greater Horn would be inadequate Therefore this manual will attempt to examine conflict through four distinct lenses regional national local and thematic Specifically an analysis of current and potential regional national and local conflicts in the Greater Horn precedes a thematic section which distinguishes between intra-regional and extra-regional factors as well as between systemic and conflict-enabling conditions

This document supports the manual *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict A Guide for Practitioners* that Creative Associates International developed for the RADARS team of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative

> The Greater Horn of Africa comprises of ten countries Burundi, Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda Somalia Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

II.   Current and Potential Conflicts in the Greater Horn of Africa

A   Regional-Level Conflicts in the Greater Horn

There is a long history of multi-layered regional-level, cross-border conflict in the Greater Horn It has often been fueled and at times instigated by external interests using politico-military factions to achieve larger geo-strategic objectives

- The Mengistu regime in Ethiopia aided the SPLA and the SNM

- Successive Sudanese governments supported the EPLF and TPLF

- The Somali government assisted liberation movements in Ethiopia s Ogaden

- For decades refugees have poured in and out of Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania to escape conflict

- Historical claims by Somalis on chunks of territory in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti have kept that sub-region unstable since Somali independence

In the post-colonial era the Greater Horn has repeatedly been engulfed in conflict at the regional national and sub-national level Armed rebellions have often been born in exile Gilbert Khadiagala calls the Greater Horn a 'region of geocultural proximity prone to contagion of security and insecurity   Domestic tranquility dovetails with regional security since successful policies are often emulated across the region while unsuccessful ones have the potential of unleashing violence and instability "[1]

There are three major conflict clusters in the Greater Horn which in recent years have crossed national boundaries threatened regional security, and may chronically re-explode in spasms of violence

- Sudan s regional destabilization agenda

- The Great Lakes conflagration

- The conflicts involving Somalis in the region

Each of these regional-level conflicts will now be analyzed in detail

1   Sudan's Regional Destabilization

The war in Sudan evolved from an internal civil war to a regional security crisis in 1994-1995

- The government of Sudan, supported and controlled by the National Islamic Front (or NIF), is engaged in low-intensity conflicts with the governments of Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia with larger war clouds ominously on the horizon

- The NIF regime in Sudan is supporting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) Ugandan rebel groups based in southern Sudan, the Ugandan government in turn has assisted the rebel Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA) which has battled on numerous occasions with the LRA and WNBF

- In addition to the military activity between Sudan and Uganda Eritrea and Ethiopia, cross-border conflict of one kind or another is also occurring between Sudan and Zaire, Central African Republic and Egypt

It is not an exaggeration to foresee the possibility of a major regional war escalating over ideology and resources, especially political Islam and the use of the Nile waters

During the March 1995 Arab Islamic Popular Conference in Khartoum, Hassan al-Turabi and other Muslim leaders reportedly agreed to focus their *jihad* on Eritrea, Ethiopia Somalia Uganda, Zaire, and Libya Terrorist training camps have been identified in Khartoum North Gedaref, Kardos, Kassala, Sennar and other locations [2] Representatives of numerous terrorist organizations travel regularly through Sudan including Hamas Hizbollah, Abu Nidal, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Gama al-Islamiya and the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution at the ministerial level has demanded that Khartoum hand over three terrorists suspected of attempting to assassinate Hosni Mubarek, and have called on the NIF regime to halt its support for terrorism

Eritrean President Isias Aferworki acknowledges that regional governments have a strategy to contain and eventually overthrow the NIF regime in Sudan "We are no longer prepared to play Tom and Jerry games with Khartoum The stability of the region depends on the regime's defeat There is no more room for diplomacy and no compromise " Rather than direct military invasion Sudan s neighbors — particularly Eritrea, Uganda and increasingly Ethiopia — will provide or are already providing support to southern and northern opposition forces [3]

This support takes the form of low-intensity destabilization through proxies Some proxies are firmly established liberation movements and welcome the outside support Others are recent constructs created to terrorize or destabilize along the lines of RENAMO in Mozambique when it was supported by South Africa (and before that Rhodesian security)

- Current proxy strategies in the region include Ugandan support for the SPLA (an organization a number of groups inside and outside the region view as a weapon against the Sudanese government) and Eritrean support for the Sudan Alliance Forces and the Beja Congress in Eastern Sudan

- The Sudan government s assistance to proxies includes WNBF and LRA in Uganda the Eritrean Jihad in the refugee camps near the Sudan-Eritrea border IPK in Kenya, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) in Ethiopia fundamentalist groups in Somalia and various Egyptian militant groups

A sketch of relations between Sudan and each of its neighbors is instructive

♦ **Sudan and Uganda**

In late April 1995 Uganda broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan following months of escalating hostilities and charges of supporting rebel movements in each other s territories Sudan s alleged aerial bombardment inside Uganda was the last straw Talks between Sudan and Uganda in Tripoli had collapsed when the LRA attacked Atiak in northern Uganda killing 250 civilians in mid-April 1995 Last-ditch negotiations in Malawi aimed at restoring relations foundered on Uganda s demand to Khartoum to disband LRA camps inside southern Sudan at Palataka and Parajok and a WNBF camp in Morobo [4] Allegations of violations of territorial integrity are frequent on both sides

Uganda has supported the SPLA for years That support was key to SPLA offensives in the late 1980s that won significant territory in Equatoria, the region bordering Uganda Rebel activity in northern Uganda was nearly eliminated when the border was SPLA-controlled Since the SPLA s heavy losses in Equatoria in 1992-1995 rebel activity in northern Uganda has expanded

Uganda-SPLA cooperation is increasing In late October 1995 the Sudanese regime accused Uganda of a combined attack of Ugandan and SPLA forces on Parajok Uganda s increased support to the SPLA has followed increased attacks by LRA and WNBF based in southern Sudan The SPLA attacked the WNBF near Morobo killing 64 militia A *quid pro quo* for Ugandan support for the SPLA was that the SPLA would attack LRA positions inside southern Sudan The SPLA and LRA clashed during the SPLA s capture of Palataka, a town which the LRA was using as a base to attack northern Uganda By early 1996 the SPLA was gearing for an advance on Juba the most important town in southern Sudan

At a hearing in Uganda s parliament in mid-1995 Minister of State for Security Col Kahinda Otafiire asked for the authority to pursue rebels fleeing across the border into Sudan [5] President Museveni has requested permission from Parliament to go to war against the Sudanese government if he deems it so necessary Divisions exist within the Ugandan government over whether to intervene directly in southern Sudan although Museveni himself supports "commando-style operations" against Ugandan rebel bases there [6]

♦ *Sudan and Eritrea*

Eritrea s very existence poses a threat to Sudan s territorial integrity as a precedent-setting justification for the right of self-determination for southern Sudanese   For its part   Sudan threatens Eritrea s tenuous balance of ethnicity and religion by supporting the Eritrean Islamic Jihad   Consequently   Eritrea has stepped up its support of the Sudanese opposition Beja Congress   hosted successful meetings of the Sudanese opposition National Democratic Alliance in June 1995 and January 1996, begun training and assisting the opposition Sudan Alliance Forces (a splinter group of the Legitimate Command) in its incursions into eastern Sudan since mid-December 1995   and increased its contacts with the SPLA

Eritrea hosted a conference of Sudanese opposition in June 1995 which revived the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an umbrella for opposition activity   At the conference, the NDA formed a committee to develop a strategy to overthrow the NIF regime   The NDA also supported separating church and state devolving power to the regions, and an eventual referendum on self-determination for southern and transition zone populations

The new element in the NDA is the emergence of ethnically-based opposition groups involving the Nuba Fur and Beja   The SPLA perceives these groups as perhaps the only hope for opening a military front in the north to relieve some pressure on the SPLA in the south   The Beja Congress   a strong supporter of self-determination for eastern Sudan, nominally controls parts of the Sudanese-Eritrean border [7]

♦ *Sudan and Egypt*

Relations between Sudan and Egypt deteriorated rapidly after the attempt on President Mubarek's life in Addis Ababa on June 26   1995, which Mubarek accused Sudan of masterminding   Since then   the war of words has been hot   Mubarek told Sudanese exiles in Cairo that "Egypt is capable of overthrowing the Sudanese regime in ten days" if it wanted [8]   Soon after, Hassan al-Turabi publicly threatened to control the flow of the Nile   "They have no underground supply of water and if Sudan is provoked to interfere with water agreements this is going to be deadly "[9]   Clashes along the Sudan-Egyptian border have occurred as well   Egypt has escalated its political confrontation with Sudan as well as its support of the Sudanese opposition

The Egyptian government distinguishes between the NIF and the Bashir government, and hopes for a removal of the former from power, while not rejecting the latter's continuing role in cooperation with the sectarian parties, DUP and Umma [10]

♦ *Sudan and Ethiopia*

The Ethiopian government had pursued a non-confrontational policy until 1995   But in the aftermath of the attempt on President Mubarek s life, Ethiopia publicly accused Sudan of involvement, ordered Sudan to slash its embassy staff from 15 to 4, banned Sudan Airways from the country, shut down three Islamic aid agencies it accuses of ties to Khartoum, and closed the Sudanese consulate in the Gambela area bordering Sudan   The Foreign Ministry in Addis Ababa said the moves were against "Sudanese institutions in Ethiopia which have served as sanctuaries for terrorists "[11]

In early 1996 Sudan accused the Ethiopian government of attacking targets in Gedaref state and occupying a number of eastern Sudanese villages Ethiopia is supporting an autonomous unit of the mostly Nuer South Sudan Independence Army (SSIA) led by Stephen Duol Chuol and based in Ethiopia and has launched incursions in the Kurmuk area The Ethiopian government s relationship with the SPLA is strained and primary Ethiopian support therefore goes to Nuer factions The Ethiopian government resents the SPLA s long association with the Mengistu regime and Addis support of Sudanese armed resistance will circumvent the SPLA to the maximum extent possible

The Sudanese government is also alleged to provide sporadic support to the IFLO and fundamentalist elements in the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

♦   ***Sudan and Kenya, Somalia, and Chad***

In each of these countries the NIF supports internal political activities or parties In Somalia, General Aidid has received support as has the IPK in Kenya

♦   ***Sudan and Zaire***

Insecurity in northern Zaire is exacerbated by the large number of Sudanese refugees from Equatoria and the occasional use of Zairian territory as a staging point for Sudanese government attacks on SPLA positions

♦   ***Sudan and Refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea***

Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Sudan could increasingly get caught up in worsening relations in the region There are officially 300 000 Ethiopian and a half million Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan [12]

The Sudanese authorities want more aid money in exchange for hosting the refugees, or the refugees may face the possibility of being expelled If cross-border military activity heats up, the refugees will certainly get dragged into the political jockeying

2   The Great Lakes Conflagration

The nearly 2 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire Tanzania and Burundi represent one of the most massive crises of civilian displacement since World War II Potential for conflict in the region is rising as the leaders of these refugee populations prepare for war Many of these leaders are the same extremists who organized and executed the 1994 genocide

Obstacles preventing easy repatriation of these populations include continuous disinformation about conditions in Rwanda and Burundi the lack of functioning, independent judicial systems in both countries and human rights abuses most glaring in Burundi [13]

Refugees have organized many revolutions in the region this is but the latest For example the Rwandan Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) was born in southern Uganda a generation after colonial and post-colonial communal violence forced thousands of Tutsis out of Rwanda Prominent members of what became the RPF were instrumental in assisting Yoweri Museveni s National Resistance Army (NRA) to topple Uganda s President Milton Obote in 1985 General Paul Kagame now Vice President of Rwanda, was once head of NRA intelligence Museveni s support was instrumental in preparing the RPF for its initial invasion in 1990 and its eventual victory four years later although many observers and Museveni himself claim that he did not instigate the invasion

Another powerful example of cross-border connections, this time between Rwanda and Burundi was the October 1993 assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president in Burundi's history The Tutsi-dominated army responsible for the assassination graphically demonstrated to Hutus the perils of relying on democratization and the Arusha peace process The 200 000 Burundian Hutu refugees who sought refuge in Rwanda from the post-assassination violence added fuel to the anti-Tutsi fire in Rwanda Many of them were incorporated into the Rwandan regime's political mobilization strategies in south-central Rwanda, where resistance to extremism had been the highest Leaders of that resistance were to become the first targets of genocide [14] Some refugees actively participated in the genocide, sometimes acting as the "shock troops for local militias "[15]

A third example comes from the 1993 Rwandan peace agreement The Arusha Accords provided for the right of return for refugees, a key plank in the RPF s political platform But little provision was made to accommodate the refugees back into one of the most densely populated countries in the world Major fears and tensions resulted, adding fuel to extremist propaganda campaigns and destabilization plans leading up to the genocide [16]

♦   *Preparing for War*

After being pushed out of Rwanda, the former government has rebuilt its military capacity in preparation for an assault on Rwanda, principally from bases in Zaire Col Theoneste Bagasora, Counselor to the Minister of Defense of the former government, threatened to "wage a war that will be long and full of dead people until the minority Tutsi are finished and completely out of the country " Arms have allegedly come from France and Zaire and recruiting has progressed for the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the militias The former militias have been increasingly incorporated into the ex-FAR structure and Human Rights Watch estimates the ex-FAR's troop strength to be at 50 000 men in a dozen camps Ex-FAR and militia leaders have allied themselves with Hutu militias from Burundi, further regionalizing the conflict [17] After a November 1995 field visit, one observer notes that "platoon-sized" operations are being run by *Interahamwe* in western Rwandan border areas [18]

The cooperation of the Zairian government — particularly forces close to President Mobutu Sese Seko — is critical to the ex-FAR s reorganization Shelter, protection and access to arms which Zaire has afforded the genocide organizers have been critical in their re-emergence [19] As of late November 1995, neither Zaire or Kenya had arrested suspects being investigated by the International War Crimes Tribunal Instead, they are allowed free movement Zaire has permitted Colonel Bagasora to regroup and rearm his men These men are being supported by humanitarian aid channelled through family members in sanctioned refugee camps

Rwandese women are returning to border regions inside Rwanda while their families remain in the refugee camps The women attempt to reclaim their property cultivate rent out their land and/or check out the safety of their return but also — as African Rights alleges — to provide "information to their mentolk on their reconnaissance visits " The presumption of innocence more readily afforded to women than men simplifies their work [0]

Even more alarming are the infiltrations by FAR or *Interahamwe* militia themselves which occur several times a week They have established small bases in the Gishwati Forest in Gisenyi Region Most of the RPA abuses have occurred in these areas of consistent infiltration attempting to eradicate the militias support base RPA forces are concentrated in the border areas heightening refugee fears and paranoia about the Rwandan government s intentions regarding repatriating Hutus [21]

There are parallels between refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire there have been problems with camp security impunity with regard to the perpetrators of genocide increasing militarization and control of refugee camps by extremist cells [22]

The Zairian security contingent in the camps (CZSC) has reported militia training and nightly ex-FAR and militia incursions from Kibumba [23] The UNHCR and UNAMIR in Gisenyi have observed incursions into Rwanda since February 1995 [24]

Leaders of smaller camps some who have been identified as well-known *Interahamwe* militia have just as much power and maybe more than their counterparts in large camps [25]

Interahamwe have contacts with Hutu militia in Burundi that have resulted in groups regularly crossing the border between Tanzania and Burundi [26] Politicians in Burundi posit the possibility that Hutu militias in Zaire and Tanzania may invade Rwanda through northern Burundi Currently, *Interahamwe* forces participate in military incursions by Hutu militias into northern Burundi

In the Tanzanian camps authorities have not been able to stop the militias from organizing and training The camps are located very close to the border and the same problems exist as in Zaire on the Tanzanian side to contain cross-border incursions by ex-FAR and militia units

Attacks into Rwanda from Zaire Tanzania and Burundi have become increasingly violent since September 1995 They have three purposes eliminating witnesses to the genocide, killing or evicting squatters and forced recruitment for extremist militias [27]

♦   *The Refugee Conundrum*

Zaire s *refoulement* of Rwandese refugees in August 1995 and smaller incidents of forced return from the Tanzanian and Burundi camps graphically portray the potential for regional destabilization inherent in the huge camps in Zaire and Tanzania While there may indeed be more forced repatriation, key Zairian government officials, soldiers officers and businessmen profit from the refugees presence even while the ecology suffers through deforestation, soil erosion and water pollution Internal politics in Zaire will determine whether major forcible repatriation occurs

The refugee populations in Zaire and Tanzania wreak tremendous damage on Zairian daily life through increased crime violence, environmental degradation and racketeering. The refugees contribute to broader political instability in Zaire and Tanzania especially in the context of a possible census and upcoming elections in Zaire. Host communities lose employment opportunities to lower-paid refugees, perceive refugee populations as having higher standards of living because of aid and trade and see social services stretched beyond their limits. Tensions and resentments are inevitable. Increasingly militant refugee leaders produce further instability and threaten to plunge the entire region into conflict.

Rwandan refugees in Burundi also demonstrate the regional nature of instability. In March 1995 an attack on the Majuri refugee camp in northern Burundi pushed 40,000 Rwandans toward the Tanzanian border. Overall there are nearly 300,000 Burundian refugees in the region.

The Zairian government was a key supporter of the former Rwandan government. Ties between Zairian and former Rwandan government leaders are still close. during the August 1995 *refoulement*, Zairian authorities did not target former Rwandan military (FAR), members of Rwandan militias, or other camp leaders [28]

Exiled Rwandan leaders might organize a mass voluntary repatriation using the refugee civilians as shields for their return. This repatriation/invasion scenario would allow *Interahamwe* militia cells to remain intact. The inevitable chaos and confusion would undoubtedly spark a major reaction from RPA forces, and would enable former leaders to escalate their campaign of disinformation about the RPA (perfected during the last year in the camps) and thus further cement the loyalties of their repatriating subjects [29]

A dual power structure exists within the camps. camp leaders' responsibilities are based on where they currently live in the camps and in their *commune* of origin in Rwanda. Neighborhood representatives reinforce the power of the camp president who rival the power of the administrative representatives. The localized command structure in the camps is based on a similar "home guard" project in Rwanda that made the genocide possible, with at least one armed man for every ten households [30]

In order to assure continued humanitarian assistance, refugee leaders have seen to it that aid workers are no longer threatened, soldiers are rarely seen, and militia training no longer takes place publicly. However Hutu extremists continue to manipulate refugees by controlling the flow of information and political discourse in the camps [31] Refugee leaders have also formed more overtly political organizations including the RDR (*Rassemblement pour le retour et la democratie au Rwanda*) and ORERWA-GUTAHA (*Organisation pour le retour au Rwanda*), both of which demand power-sharing with the RPF

The size of the refugee population itself presents a threat to regional peace and security. One UNICEF study found that $65 million of damage — primarily to the ecology and productive base — was done in the first six months of the refugee influx into Tanzania [32]

♦   ***Disputes Between Uganda and Kenya***

Jockeying between Kenya and Uganda for leadership in East Africa is another element of regional insecurity related to the Rwandan question. Partially to counter Museveni's long-standing support for the RPF, Moi accuses Museveni of planning to dominate the region and has provided a haven for former government officials from Rwanda, including those suspected of organizing the genocide. Diplomats from

the current Rwandan government have been expelled from Nairobi Moi also blames Museveni for causing the genocide because of the latter s support for the RPF and uses the specter of Rwandan massacres and anarchy to buttress his anti-democratic arguments

Moi supports the division of Rwanda and Burundi into two mono-ethnic countries one Hutu and one Tutsi This is consistent with his concept of *majimboism* under which ethnic groups retreat to their home areas In Kenya this would mean that Kalenjin and Masai pastoralists the heart of the current government s support base would dominate the Rift Valley Province the richest agricultural area in the country

3   The Somali Conflicts

Long before Siad Barre's militaristic pursuit of Somali irredentist claims regions bordering Somalia have been unstable Boundary divisions left Somali populations on both sides of the borders of four countries — Kenya Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia —as well as one unrecognized one, the Republic of Somaliland The Somali remain the most suspect minority in Ethiopia and Kenya because they retain strong ties to the Somali Republic

Major wars and minor skirmishes have been fought to expand or maintain the Somali state including the Ogaden War in 1977-78 the bombing of Hargeisa in 1990 the Shifta War on the Kenya-Somali border and following the 1988 peace agreement signed between Siad Barre and Mengistu, a surprise attack by the Somali National Movement on northern Somalia setting into motion a chain reaction which culminated in Barre s 1991 overthrow

Competition over lucrative trade routes constitutes an additional point of contention in the region Trade syndicates in the region compete aggressively to route trade through the most profitable avenues available Governments are heavily involved in the competition A principal economic issue in Region Five in Ethiopia for example, is control over trade routes for goods from the region exported through Berbera Conflict in Mogadishu and Lower Juba is driven by similar issues In all of the countries with ports — Eritrea Djibouti Somalia and unrecognized Somaliland — a port is the primary revenue-generating asset

♦   *The Ogaden*

Ogadeni populations in what is now called the Somali Region of Ethiopia (formerly Region Five and before that the Ogaden) historically fought to return their territory to Somalia's control But the ethnic federalist system in Ethiopia has added a new political variable and the currently dominant regional faction, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) is exploiting that arrangement to consolidate political control of the region while expanding its leaders and supporters trade ties with Djibouti and Somaliland The previous governing group the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF), is fragmenting along both sides of the debate about whether to join the political process in Ethiopia or fight for independence and eventual merging with Somalia

In 1994 a low-intensity conflict arose between the government of Ethiopia and the ONLF over control of the regional government and the right of secession The ONLF used guerilla tactics, while EPRDF forces employed counter-insurgency methods In 1995 the non-Ogadeni ESDL formed the regional government after disputed elections, largely without a divided ONLF's participation

It is too early to tell whether these politics of exclusion will destabilize the region with ripple effects possible in Ethiopia Somalia and Somaliland With their independence aspirations blocked will the ONLF slowly re-engage in the political process or will they return to the bush to fight another round of guerilla warfare? It is another question altogether whether the independence issue creates conflict or whether the real fuel for fighting comes from the contest of regional political power and the patronage access to aid and resources and access to lucrative trade routes that can come from holding the levers of governance

◆ *Djibouti-Somaliland*

In 1995 numerous clashes occurred along the Djibouti-Somaliland border between the Somaliland government army and the United Somali Front militia an Issa organization The Issa control the government in Djibouti, but Issa sub-clans represent the primary armed opposition in Somaliland When tensions escalated in early August 1995, fighting focused on control of a nine-square-kilometer area claimed by Issa pastoralists in western Somaliland who demand regional autonomy based on the peace agreement signed by all sub-clans in Boraama in 1993 They are accusing the government of violating the peace charter by attempting to set up a regional administration controlled by the central government which would marginalize the Issa in that area in favor of the Isaaq and Gadaboursy

Djibouti is supporting the opposition in Somaliland to undermine Mohamed Egal's government there for clan and economic reasons Economically Djibouti is competing with Berbera for import-export traffic into Ethiopia Djibouti supports the opposition to undermine current stability in Somaliland, while the Ethiopian government has been very supportive of the Egal administration Trade is booming along the Berbera-Jijiga-Addis route and the head of the ESDL is Habr Awol and very close to the Somaliland government

◆ *Somaliland*

The Somaliland government s span of control is firm only in Issaq/Habr Awol areas principally Hargeisa, Boraama and Berbera The Issa/Garhajis opposition responded violently to the government's expulsions of an Idigalle militia from the Hargeisa airport in October 1994, sparking a new phase of the civil war Broader grievances have sustained the rebellion, including the opposition's contention that Egal s government violated the Boraama peace agreement by shelving regional autonomy, appointing regional governors, and re-centralizing authority

Conflict in Somaliland falls mainly along these lines given the ease of mobilizing on the basis of clan victimization and superiority as well as the historical competition between the Garhajis and the Habr Awol

Conflict in Somalia will be discussed below

B. National-Level Conflict in the Greater Horn

This section analyzes the dynamics of national-level conflict in all ten countries of the Greater Horn For the purposes of this paper, national-level conflict is defined as conflict which is for the most part contained within national borders and has national implications, primarily in the context of struggles for control of the state

The ten countries are divided into three categories according to their potential for the outbreak or continuation of violent conflict   Admittedly these are rather arbitrary distinctions and the crystal ball of every analyst shows a different picture nevertheless these divisions represent a judgement based on the cyclical nature of current violent conflicts and the volatility and depth of disputes which are ongoing or are likely to arise in the short-to-medium-term

POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT	COUNTRIES
High	• Sudan • Somalia • Rwanda • Burundi
Medium	• Ethiopia • Kenya • Uganda
Low	• Tanzania • Eritrea • Djibouti

1   Countries with High Potential for Conflict

a)   Sudan

Control of valuable natural resources is a critical element in Sudan s civil war

■   Southerners resented their lack of input into and the nature of President Numeiry s plans to construct the massive Jonglei Canal aimed at diverting more water from the Nile River for irrigation in Egypt and the water-starved north   Southerners feared it would disrupt their region s ecology by draining the vast Sudd swamp vital to southern nomadic pastoralists (livestock farmers) and creating new farming areas which would be reserved for northern farmer settlers   Despite southern opposition the Numeiry government brought in a French multinational corporation to begin excavating the canal in the early 1980s   Since 1983 the SPLA has blocked work on the project

■   Southerners feel the south should benefit most from the large oil deposits that Chevron discovered in southern Sudan   Southern politicians vehemently oppose central government plans to pipe the crude oil north for refining and export   At one point the Numeiry government tried to redraw the boundary between the north and south so as to incorporate the oil deposits in the north leaving the south out of the planning process altogether   The SPLA brought Chevron's work to a halt in 1983

■   Successive northern governments have utilized war tactics which have attempted to depopulate areas of the south and transition zone which border the north   These are prime agricultural areas   These

tactics represent a deliberate strategy to clear these areas for the southward movement of mechanized agriculture by wealthy northern agricultural interests [4]

War in Sudan goes beyond the struggle for control of potential wealth-producing resources It has become a means of suppressing economic and political discontent War in Sudan has also served to weaken particular ethnic groups while enriching those in power

♦   ***Total War***[5]

An unparalleled period of civil conflict unfolded in the embattled region of southern Sudan During the 1990s hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and large segments of the population of the region are being indiscriminately stripped of their assets at times rendering whole communities dependent on international aid The entire process is abetted and at times directed by the regime in Khartoum using age-old antagonisms to undertake textbook divide-and-rule military tactics [6]

Total war usually targets the opponent's subsistence base causing massive transfers of wealth due to asset-stripping For example

- The NIF government has pushed into Nuba Fur Zaghawa, and southwest Dinka areas

- SPLA factions have facilitated asset-stripping by civilian supporters in areas they control against civilians supporting the opposition

- Part of the Jikany-Lou Nuer sectional fighting is fueled by rival SSIA commanders enriching themselves from asset-stripping

- The government s land policy demonstrates that the war is no longer over the south s economic potential, but rather its actual exploitation, such as land in southern Kordofan and around Juba as demonstrated through the export of sorghum millet and live animals cattle raiding, and exploiting oil reserves

Civilian populations are the main military targets in the war Using the cynical logic of counter-insurgency — "drain the water to catch the fish" — all the main combatants have conducted anti-civilian military campaigns over the past half decade to destroy the livelihoods of communities perceived as real or potential supporters of opponents

Villages more often than towns are targeted in low profile maximum destruction, scorched earth sweeps Houses are burned livestock and food stolen, women raped young men killed or forcibly conscripted, and wells poisoned All factions participate, the government the main rebel (SPLA), the splinter rebel group South Sudan Independence Army (SSIA) and militia groups armed and directed by all three parties

The rationale behind this degeneration into asset-stripping and village burning as favored military tactics is stark but clear All factions believe that subjugating unfriendly communities requires destroying ways of life and livelihoods, completely disempowering these communities creates an absolute dependence which ultimately breeds compliance to those in power positions, meaning those with guns

The Dinka the largest ethnic group in Sudan show the enormous complexity of civil conflict in Sudan Dinka wealth not poverty makes them a persistent target of opposing groups Merchants militias and army officers have caused two major famines in Dinka territory in Bahr al-Ghazal in 1987-1988 and in Jonglei in 1991-1993 Tremendous profits have been earned through looting livestock forced labor on commercial farms and manipulation of relief supplies and grain markets While hundreds of thousands have died in these two famines a small number of people have profited greatly from their misery

Ethnicity means vulnerability to attack in southern Sudan The Nuba and the Dinka are victims of ethnic cleansing by the Government the Dinka have been the object of SSIA attacks Nuer communities have been targeted by the SPLA and Equatorian communities along the Kenyan and Ugandan borders are victims of government bombings SPLA atrocities and village burnings Recruiting drives by all factions inevitably will draw these people further into the fray

The main beneficiary of ethnic warfare is the government The government's war strategy generally does not require direct involvement in military operations Instead, the government manipulates the various southern factions against each other sometimes providing weapons or cash at other times coordinating military strategy with various factions and often conducting their own low-visibility raids on villages around the southern towns they control Only rarely must the government resort to massive offensives to gain new territory

For example the government s use of Kerobino Kuanyin Bol s militia a Nuer militia from Mankien the Popular Defense Force militia from Southern Kordofan as well as the regular government troop advances and their aerial bombardment against positions in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal are intended to create famine by destroying the coping mechanisms of the Dinka from that area This largely unreported war — Amnesty International calls it a hidden war — has been going on since 1992 replicating a similar campaign in the mid-1980s The government has denied access to many points in northern Bahr al-Ghazal to UN relief efforts in the last few years The area has not yet seen mass famine as in 1987-1988 but there are major localized food shortages Furthermore, due to asset-stripping cattle have become more concentrated as the rich have gotten richer and the average person has seen his/her access reduced Furthermore cattle have to be kept further away to avoid raiding reducing people s access to milk Allegations of slave-raiding emanate from this area as well as Nuba and Dinka areas of Southern Kordofan

A US State Department cable from April 1993 describes the following atrocities

> In late 1992 and early in February-March 1993 two military trains each with about 3 000 troops aboard proceeded from Babanusa to Wau Some of the troops were from militias

> The first train advanced preceded by foot soldiers who killed or captured the civilians on their path They burned houses fields and granaries and stole thousands of cattle Hundreds are estimated to have died

> The March 1993 train carried horses that extended the soldiers range In five days, they reportedly killed almost a thousand persons between Manwal Station and Aweil and captured 300 women and children The burning of granaries and fields and theft of cattle caused many who escaped the troops to die later of starvation

> When military convoys moving in the Bahr al-Ghazal lose vehicles to SPLA mines, the troops typically burn the first village they find and kill its inhabitants

Government forces especially the PDF routinely steal women and children in Bahr al-Ghazal Some women and girls are kept as wives the others are shipped north where they perform forced labor on Kordofan farms or are exported notably to Libya Many Dinka are reported to be performing forced labor in the areas of Meiram and Abyei Others are said to be on farms throughout Kordofan

Arab soldiers are encouraged to wed southern women whom they capture In a policy known as the marriage of 50 soldiers who have children from these marriages get special premiums

Food becomes a powerful instrument of warfare in this and other ongoing civil conflicts

■ Access to food relief can be denied or disrupted

■ Warring factions routinely divert food aid for their own sustenance

■ Civilians are used to attract internationally donated food supplies which are then diverted

■ Warring factions gain legitimacy by providing food aid

■ Warring factions or their sympathizers can monetize, barter or otherwise manipulate food aid to obtain arms or fuel

■ Food aid can be provided to supporters, denying it to those who may not be sympathetic or of the correct ethnic, racial, or religious group

When these egregious violations of international humanitarian standards are combined with military strategies of asset-stripping and destruction, it is easy to see why the emergency is chronic, flaring up in various locations throughout the south on a continuous basis in response to the application of these tactics

Border access is another critical factor driving all factions and their benefactors

■ Cross-border commerce is lucrative

■ Arms re-supply thrives when based near borders

■ Arms providers fighting wars by proxy need border access for their beneficiaries to launch cross-border attacks

The militarization of culture and authority continues Fighting is a livelihood, often the most lucrative and promising available This has meant weaker tribal authority and civil structures, often deliberately encouraged by the Government of Sudan and SPLA

♦ *Current Political Dynamics*

Strong currents of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Arab cultural nationalism in the north have further inflamed the conflicts, especially in recent years At independence, Sudan was constitutionally a secular state As military ruler from 1969 to 1985, President Numeiry gradually Islamicized the legal system

Islamic laws were introduced in 1983 but not fully implemented The democratically elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi was reluctant to repeal Islamic law despite its unpopularity with many northern and virtually all southern Sudanese

General Omar el-Bashir who ousted Sadiq al Mahdi in June 1989 has pushed Islamization deepening the south s alienation The legal code effectively makes non-Muslims second-class citizens and curtails the rights of Muslims who are not fundamentalists It severely limits women s rights Islamic courts now can punish by crucifixion amputation stoning and flogging ¯

But Sudan s divisions are not simply north versus south Muslim versus Christian or African versus Arab Many northerners are non-Muslims many Muslim Sudanese are African and many Sudanese Muslims oppose fundamentalism and Islamic law It is mostly because differences in ethnicity and religion coincide with gaps in economic political and social status that these cleavages lead to violence [8]

The National Islamic Front has established a parallel government which runs Sudan through a covert secretariat referred to as the "Council of 40 " A multi-faceted security structure has developed including a private security service for Turabi as well as organs for revolutionary security state security military intelligence police security and foreign security

NIF receives assistance from supporters throughout the Middle East Islamic banks and businesses and larger global networks Militia members from numerous countries transit Sudan regularly and often travel on Sudanese passports "[9]

It is not likely that a change in government in Khartoum will be peaceful largely because of the extensive internal security networks which have been constructed as well as the objectives of external aid providers and the assistance they would continue to provide in the context of any *jihad*

There are numerous opposition groups loosely allied with the SPLA in the National Democratic Alliance including the main sectarian parties the Umma and Democratic Unionist Parties, the Communist Party the Modern Forces (trade unions and other progressive elements), the Beja Congress and two groups of exiled military officers the Legitimate Command and the Sudan Allied Forces (SAF) The Beja Congress and the SAF appear to be the only imminent military threat to the NIF regime although the Umma Party still retains the loyalty of the Ansar militias in western Sudan who could become a factor if civil war reached the north

The current political dynamics of conflict in southern Sudan are discussed in the section on Sub-National Conflict

❖   *Historical Roots of War in Sudan*

Born of a centuries-old process of Arabization and Islamization northern Sudan represents the integration of immigrant Arabs and an indigenous population In the seventh century the north long the stronghold of three prosperous Christian kingdoms with a predominantly Christian population, began to give way to a growing Islamic influence By the 16th century these kingdoms had been overthrown and the Islamization process intensified

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Emboldened with a decided advantage in military technology the Arab-Islamic empire spread throughout Nubian and Beja territory   Treaties were enacted which were significantly more favorable to the Arab-Muslims   further strengthening their economic   social   cultural and religious status   This heightened status also served to increase the gap between Arab-Muslims and the African populations   regarded as heathens as well as potential slaves by the northerners

While the Arabic and Islamic influence was powerful in the north   it was much less so in the south   The south was forbidding and hostile to the Arabs both because of the natural environment and the opposition of Nilotic groups to Arab encroachment and domination

Today   Sudan continues to reflect these characteristics of racial   cultural, ethnic, religious, and geographical diversity and disparity   The north comprises two-thirds of the land and an even higher share of the population and has remained politically, culturally, and economically dominant   It is also more developed although there are great disparities between the central region and the peripheral regions in the west and east   While the south has more arable land and identified natural resources than the north, it remains largely undeveloped   Prior to and during the first civil war, the south was one of the most undeveloped areas in Africa

Following the first civil war and despite promises to the contrary, most development projects — roads, agriculture   forestry — were concentrated in Western and Eastern Equatoria provinces   Development activities proposed for Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal were either large scale and long-term or experimental, and provided little real development for the regions in which such activities took place   Some improvements were made to basic services and infrastructure   especially in the area of rural water supplies   There was also some growth of indigenous commercial activity which contributed to the export earnings of the south

As development continued in the south, an economic crisis developed in the north as its subsistence economy began to dissolve   As a result, the south's natural resources — oil, water, land — became increasingly important to the government and to commercial interests in the north   What wealth Sudan possesses is heavily skewed along class and regional lines   The south, for years receiving less than its fair share of international aid, government allocation and commercial investment, began to attract projects to develop oil and water resources

Mohammed Suliman discusses one of the economic causes of war

> Ecological degradation over the past three decades   mainly caused by large-scale mechanized farming, has added a new dimension to the old conflict   The collapse of the subsistence economy of the huge Sahelian region in the north of Sudan as a result of climatic change and the exploitation of natural resources by the merchant class is the driving force behind the biggest onslaught so far by the mainly northern Sudanese elite on the peoples of the south

Douglas Johnson identifies nine historical factors that exacerbated the civil war in Sudan

- Patterns of governance which developed in the Sudanic states before the 19th Century, establishing an exploitive relationship between centralized state power and the hinterlands, and creating groups of peoples with an ambiguous status in relation to the state

- The introduction of a particular brand of militant Islam in the late 19th century which further sharpened the divide between persons with and without full legal rights within the state

- Inequalities in economic educational and political development within the colonial state of the 20th century which in some cases built upon earlier patterns

- Britain s decision based on political expediency to grant independence to the whole of Sudan before disparities in development could be overcome and without obtaining adequate guarantees for safeguarding the interests of the southern Sudan

- A narrowly based nationalist movement in Sudan which did not adequately address the issues of Sudan s diversity and unequal development, but which attempted to build a national identity based on the principles of Arab culture and the religion of Islam

- Failure to obtain a national consensus in either the north or the south concerning national unity regional development and the balance of power between the central and regional governments

- The weak state of Sudan's economy which hastened political instability

- Sudan s involvement in the international politics of the Cold War, which exacerbated Sudan s internal civil war

- The re-emergence of militant Islam as a major political and economic force, and the qualifications this has placed on the rights of non-Muslim citizens

b)   Somalia

Somalia is chaotic but not chaos Somalia today is a mosaic of fluid highly localized polities some based on traditional authority others reflecting hybrid arrangements These fill the vacuum created by the prolonged collapse of the state and perform many essential day-to-day governance functions [40]

The ascendence of these local polities in villages urban neighborhoods and the pastoral range may only be a transient feature of the Somali landscape until a central authority is revived Yet it is much more likely that they are a glimpse of the future of Somalian governance With all indicators suggesting that efforts to re-establish a central Somali state will continue to meet with frustration what we call "Somalia" will remain for the foreseeable future this collection of diverse and overlapping localized polities that collectively add up to something less than a conventional state

One challenge to the international community — non-governmental organizations multilateral donors states and the UN — is to learn to work constructively with these localized polities rather than against them This will not be easy Many international organizations are designed to interact with and through states alone and will have to adopt flexible new rules to engage stateless Somalia Moreover, the local polities emerging throughout Somalia are fluid in structure and authority not easily amenable to the needs of donors and states for fixed and recognizable authority structures

Somalia s vicious civil war is thought to have killed a quarter to a half million people   The primary legacy of this war is the geographical realignment of many Somali population groups with forced displacement extrajudicial execution gang rape and asset transfer of land livestock and grain reserves based primarily on sub-clan affiliation

♦   *The State of the Civil War*[1]

Some combatants in the Somali civil war have taken to the conflict s sidelines leaving only a few groups actively fighting throughout the country, excepting Somaliland   The main potential locus of military activity centers on Mogadishu, in a Hawiye turf war that sporadically pits a loose alliance of Abgal and Hawaadle against the Habr Gedir and some Murosade militias

The Hawaadle have been almost completely driven out of Mogadishu   The Murosade continue to contest territory with the Abgal in the central quarter of the Bermuda neighborhood of Mogadishu, and remain an important political, military and commercial force in Mogadishu   Ironically UNOSOM's political meddling provided some of the impetus for the battles between the Murosade and the Abgal as well as the Habr Gedir-Hawaadle rivalry UNOSOM strongly supported a peace initiative in early 1994 that excluded representatives of the Murosade and Hawaadle fueling their paranoia about being marginalized

There are significant fissures within each of these four Hawiye groups   A number of internal disputes could cause Somalia to explode, including

- Competition between traditional elites and Somalia's version of the "new rich," groups who have profited greatly from the conflict-ridden last half-decade

- The simmering competition within Habr Gedir Sa'ad between Osman Ato and Mohammed Farah Aidid

- Splits between Habr Gedir Sa'ad leaders and Habr Gedir Ayr leaders

- Rivalry between Ali Ugas and Ali Mahdi Mohammed of the Abgal

- An increasingly important Islamist movement

- A significant split within the Murosade involving some major Murosade merchants and financiers and Mohammed Qanyere Afrah, who continues to be able to mobilize a significant militia of Murosade Habr Mohammed and access support from Aidid

For the most part Darod sub-clans have stayed out of this intra-Hawiye fratricide, watching the internal fragmentation with glee

There are additional potential flashpoints

- In Galgaduud in central Somalia, between the Habr Gedir and the Marehan in that area

- In Hiran Region between the Habr Gedir and the Hawaadle

■   In Lower Juba between a number of different sub-clans

Bay Region will perpetually remain a possible target of occupation either by the Habr Gedir or the Marehan who border the Rahanweyne of Bay Region on the southeast and northwest

In September 1995 General Aidid and 600 militia captured the town of Baidoa in what was the General s biggest offensive in two years   The Leyson is the Rahanweyne sub-clan that emerged as the dominant Rahanweyne faction during and after the civil war   The Leyson formed the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) in response to Aidid s takeover of Baidoa and in October 1995 launched a counter-attack on Baidoa which Aidid s militia repulsed   Although probably not militarily powerful enough to dislodge Aidid s forces outright guerrilla resistance tactics and support from Aidid s rivals means constant instability in Bay Region for the immediate future In January 1996 Aidid s militia took Xoddur from the RRA driving nearly two-thirds of the town's 100 000 residents into the surrounding countryside

Superior firepower means the Habr Gedir may dominate militarily in the short run   General Aidid s self-proclaimed government is formalizing an army   They are all war veterans — the Ogadeni war cross-border skirmishes with Kenya the civil war and the war with UNOSOM — with experience with a variety of modes of warfare — insurgency, counter-insurgency and urban guerrilla warfare   Many were trained in Cuba

They are heavily armed, thanks to UNOSOM   One Somali elder remarked "UNOSOM came to save us from the warlords and ended up aligning with them " Faction leaders benefitted greatly from rents security contracts employment currency transactions and a variety of other fringe benefits courtesy of UNOSOM   One estimate puts the number of technicals at the disposal of Aidid and Ato at roughly 160 "There weren t that many in the entire country in 1992 " according to one long-time analyst

Nevertheless most observers feel that the Habr Gedir are not strong enough or sufficiently united to defeat the Abgal   They are exposed on many fronts and spread thinly throughout the south of the country   It is conceivable that no one will win the war ever, a state of low intensity conflict could continue indefinitely

The Habr Gedir militias have taken some key towns (Merca Baidoa, Xoddur Gelib and Belet Weyne the last of which they have since lost) and have expropriated land and homes since 1991 principally in Hiran Benadir Bay and Lower Shabelle Regions   The full extent is unmeasurable   These areas are not "controlled" by Aidid, but are certainly subject to his influence

Osman Ato was a key player in Habr Gedir expansionism formerly paying for the khat for the militia in Belet Weyne and controlling some of the farms on which Habr Gedir militia subsist in Lower Juba   Ato and Aidid continue to vie for Habr Gedir leadership   Ato has some support because of the benefits his commercial interests bring   Aidid retains his importance as a mobilizer for defensive or offensive military purposes as well as his historic leadership of the Habr Gedir   Aidid is also the best organized political/military leader in Somalia today

The Habr Gedir now control access to the main road arteries Mogadishu to Baidoa and to Kismavu, and the roads along the Juba and Shabelle Rivers up to the Ethiopian border and down almost to Kismavu They can use ports in Kismayu Merca Brava and sometimes Mogadishu   The Juba, Bay and Shabelle areas under Habr Gedir influence help feed Mogadishu South and provide tax (checkpoints) extortion and export money   Control of key airports allows them to control much of the khat traffic   Observers fear that

if the Habr Gedir lose control of or access to the ports they will move further inland to control internal production and trade more fully As of now if they can retain jurisdiction over functioning airport and port facilities in Mogadishu they will be able to dominate a significant segment of the import-export trade and tax much of what they don t control

Three examples illustrate the tenuous nature of Somalia s current stability

- The potential for conflict in Mogadishu over control of the port and airport which could result from the major Hawiye sub-clans close proximity to both these installations and the extraordinary benefits which will accrue to the controlling party

- Habr Gedir attempts to wipe out the Hawaadle and Abgal efforts to crush the Murosade

- The Marehan-Habr Gedir rivalry in Galgaduud

All are complex intra-clan conflicts which may not be easily resolved and only represent the tip of the iceberg for potential flashpoints

The unrecognized Republic of Somaliland has entered a new cycle of conflict since October 1994, when government forces — primarily Habr Awol (Isaaq clan) — expelled Garhajis (Issa clan) militias from the Hargeisa airport This is the latest chapter in a contest for control of the state — unrecognized as it is — which goes back to the overthrow of Siad Barre Numerous attempts at mediation have completely failed to reconcile the two factions

If General Aidid was to go back to war, he would have the confidence of some big merchants, mainly from Nimaale and Ayante sub-clans of Saad He commands his faction of the Habr Gedir and many mercenaries Aidid's rival Osman Hassan Ali Ato, has his strengths in heavy weapons and technicals, his membership in a large and influential subclan, and his position as former manager for the US's Conoco Oil Company [42]

◆   *Violence and Human Rights Violations*

Lawlessness puts the Bantu communities and other minorities at increased risk of parasitic looting by the *mooryaan* young bandits or youth gang members Extortion is now a way of livelihood for the *mooryaan* and a fact of life for the Bantu and other farming communities They use classic mafia rackets — "pay us to protect you from us "

Villages are randomly looted Looting is certainly more frequent than before the war but much less than in its height in 1991-1992 This extortion is probably the equivalent of pre-war government taxation There are cases of forced labor and forced displacement, and human rights organizations have found that rape is also frequent although the exact scale is difficult to measure Forced labor and looting are pure opportunism by the *mooryaan* Forced displacement is part of a decades-long pattern of more powerful groups expropriating the best farmland along the rivers

Some Bantu have been pushed from the west to the east side of the Juba River primarily by Ogadeni *moorvaan* looking to expand their territory One official observed 'Bantu vulnerability lies in the lack of control of the militias who do the looting '

A third to half of the Bantu population has disappeared from the Juba Valley they either died or were displaced The Bantu also have less employment opportunities than before the war In the Lower Shabelle Bantu workers earn somewhere between 5 000 and 20 000 Somali Shillings ($1-$4) per day working for the plantation owners who sell to Dole and Somalifruit the two multinational companies buying fruit in Lower Shabelle In the social structure of Somalia the Bantu have always suffered deep-rooted discrimination akin to a *de facto* apartheid situation

The Rahanweyne in Gedo are permanently displaced They were displaced originally by the 1991-1992 fighting When they returned they found that the Marehan had taken over their lands as part of their drive to acquire the best farmland next to the Juba River all the way down to Bua ale in Middle Juba The Rahanweyne often leave their women and children in the displaced camps in Bardera (perhaps 10 000 displaced around Bardera) while the men go cultivate Rahanweyne families must diversify income because they are now farming more marginal lands

The clan structure is the only human rights protection in Somalia today Most are armed and the potential for clan retaliation causes some restraint — the MAD principle (Mutually Assured Destruction) writ small Large armies engaged in major territorial advances caused the 1990-1992 human rights crisis by preying on defenseless subsistence agro-pastoral populations who could not retaliate While this same factor still leaves some communities with no domestic "human rights defense " some have armed themselves (Rahanweyne) and others provide a useful function (Bantu labor) so there are built-in restraints governing the human rights situation in Somalia

♦ *Political Devolution*

Politically statelessness still has a constituency those who profit from an economy of plunder Mafia-like extortion rackets and various other unlawful economic dealings, militia leaders whose power base rests on conquest and fear the *moorvaan*, members of the militia whose status would decline if a government enforced the rule of law, and entire sub-clan groups who have occupied valuable real estate in Mogadishu and the inter-riverine areas and who might forfeit ill-gotten gains if a peace agreement involved the return of stolen property

Somalia has become a collection of "town-states " some of which have forged loose security arrangements with each other The decision-making apparatus in these town-states is a balancing act between traditional authorities merchants and politico-military figures — in one agency representative s words, "An informal network of elders militia and money men " Another observer calls Kismayu "organized, stable anarchy "[45]

The soap opera of national government formation continues After Osman Ato claimed the chair of the SNA, General Aidid announced the formation of a government A national army and tax system followed within a month Ali Mahdi and other faction leaders of course objected and continue to try to establish their own rival government

There are no real examples of power-sharing at the local level   Power is pure the Marehan in Gedo Region, the Hawaadle in much of Hiran Region the Harti in Kismayu the Ogadeni in Afmadow the Habr Gedir in Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu South the Abgal in Mogadishu North and Middle Shabelle the Majerteen in the northeast   In some places the Habr Gedir use local intermediaries as in Lower Juba   And in a few places there is divided rule in Mudug two districts are controlled by Habr Gedir two by Majerteen and one is mixed

The main forms of exercised, organized authority at the local and regional level are the provision of security and dispute mediation   In many places there is insufficient will — or an inability — to organize anything beyond these two functions   Where there are airports and ports, some kind of structure is in place to administer and fight over the spoils

The militia themselves are a wild card   With no demobilization plans in place and no employment or education prospects on the horizon, many young men see little alternative to their current occupation   One observer notes, "The militias are independent, autonomous opportunistic and politically naive   They hop on the bandwagon that serves their needs "   And how deeply have they permeated the social structure?   One Somali woman sardonically replied, "Every sub-sub-sub-clan has a militia "

♦   *Historical Roots of War*

Pastoral Marginalization   Conflict surrounding rangelands in the 1980s contributed to the formation of the three main militia organizations responsible for the overthrow of Siad Barre the SNM SPM and USC [44]

Pastoral society has always been economically stratified with a few extremely wealthy herders   However in the 1970s and 1980s, small herders were unable to sustain themselves and became impoverished   Some of the men that joined the USC and SPM were once impoverished pastoralists

Prior to 1985 the prosperity accompanying the commercialization of the central rangelands was enough to absorb many of the tensions that arose   The onset of the 1987 drought brought a drastic decrease in prosperity   This turnaround enabled the USC to mobilize and create insurrection and lawlessness [45]

Poor herders' agro-pastoralism is a direct result of impoverishment and, more specifically, the rapid commercialization and monetization of pastoral society that has brought prosperity to many herders, but has left poor herders subject to severe strain [46]

Resources   Conflict over land ownership played a key role in the outbreak of war and famine in Somalia   Other resources are in demand in addition to agricultural land   These include pastures water points urban property, and markets [47]

Although resources have been contested in Somalia for centuries (in the 1500s the Abgal forced the Ajuran out of Mogadishu, in the 1800s Ogadenis displaced the Oromo from Lower Juba[48]), the race for southern Somalia s resources intensified by the early 1970s   Rights to land and water were expropriated using the levers of state authority assisted by the 1975 Land Registration Act which made all collective land state property   The government nationalized large areas in Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Hiran and Gedo for distribution to displaced Ogadeni and others favored by the Barre regime

Traditionally farmers owned land collectively Rights to land pertained for all members of a community defined as a subclan or lineage During the period of modern farming large areas of farmland in the Lower Juba and Shabelle were confiscated for Italian banana plantations In the 1950s land alienation included Somali entrepreneurs In the 1960s the ruling elite continued to gather land In the 1980s the 1975 land reform was used as a pretext for land alienation At this time as in the past land was acquired by a mixture of purchase bribery threat and violent seizure [49]

Land values soared in the 1980s due to inflation-driven land investment decreasing exports of livestock investment capital from remittances the end of grain price controls and growing urban demand for commodities produced in the interriverine region [50]

The government of Siad Barre concentrated on controlling fixed assets of land and water within the country partly through the 1975 Land Registration Act As land increased in value vast numbers of weapons from the government s arsenal were turned on domestic enemies that further militarized the process of resource control The land war was further intensified by urbanization and the drastic population growth in urban centers [51]

In 1991 in the Shabelle Valley Lower Juba and Gedo minority people fought alongside the USC against the government, believing that the USC stood for land liberation [52]

The land war accelerated after the 1991 expulsion of Darod clansmen in the Shabelle valley and Bay region and the take-over by well-armed militias of other clans (mainly Hawiye) [53]

The 1995 "banana wars" in Merca and Shalambood between militias paid by Dole (American) and Somalifruit (Italian) have shown how quickly one can take control of a productive plantation zone and their adjacent ports and reestablish business in exports [54]

c)   Rwanda

The defining act of Rwandan political history for decades to come will be the 1994 genocide Most of the moderate political establishment was wiped out along with up to a million civilians the vast majority of whom were Tutsi But the extremists did not achieve the overwhelming victory they envisioned they now find themselves international pariahs dislodged from power and simmering in refugee camps which double as rear bases for cross-border guerrilla incursions

It is quite probable that revenge will be taken frequently in the coming years land disputes in many areas may be extremely violent and reconciliation is unlikely The genocide organizers involved all segments of the Hutu population in the massacres For example women were deeply complicit in the organization and execution of the genocide African Rights points out

> The extent to which women were involved in the killings is unprecedented anywhere in the world This is not accidental The architects of the holocaust sought to implicate as much of the population as possible, including women and even children They set out to create a nation of extremists bound together by the blood of genocide [55]

♦   **Current Crisis**

Rwanda s current situation includes

- A rapidly growing population largely dependent on traditional agriculture

- An environmental crisis

- Ethnic social and cultural diversity demanding political attention

- A destroyed and inadequate infrastructure

- A history of natural and man-made disasters

- A lack of democratic choice

- A century of colonialism and the lasting effects of a long civil war

- A time of new claims on relief and development assistance and donor fatigue

Rwanda's post-genocide attempt at ethnic power-sharing was severely shaken with the dismissal of the prime minister, Faustin Twagiramunga a moderate Hutu The parliament also got rid of the interior justice, and information ministers All were Hutus, although the government complied with the Arusha Accords and replaced them with Hutus from the same political parties as those that were dismissed As he left, Mr Twagiramunga complained of the lack of power-sharing and about security Observers say Tutsi hard-liners are now calling the shots

Refugees fear returning to Rwanda because of threats of reprisal killings and arbitrary arrests This fear has been intensified with Twagiramunga's removal he had tried to pave the way to power-sharing through a peace deal reached in 1993 with the then government and rebels in Arusha, Tanzania Targeted by Hutu extremists, Twagiramunga narrowly escaped death in 1994's massacres 30 members of his family perished [6]

The RPF is consolidating its control of the administration and economy The longer the refugees and the former government stay out of the country, the further the RPF will tighten its grip

Those Tutsi that have returned include a significant entrepreneurial class which is investing and opening businesses Some of these returnees are very hard-line, they are returning to "the Promised Land" after years in exile Exiled leaders in Zaire and Tanzania fear that if they do not return to the country soon the new class will completely consolidate political and economic power without them

Justice for genocide perpetrators is not the only legal issue The broader judicial system is paralyzed in Rwanda, over 60 000 people — the vast majority accused of participation in the genocide — are detained as of early 1996 in horrendous conditions and in violation of Rwanda s own legal code In response a few donors and the NGO Citizens Network have provided intensive training for magistrates and judicial police inspectors

In Cyangugu prefecture former government leaders have targeted moderate Hutu leaders who support reconciliation and repatriation   Killing targeted individuals is part of a campaign of intimidation against Hutu support for the current government   The strategy will likely spread to other regions [57]

Some human rights workers believe that new RPF recruits actions and attitudes are a potential creator of conflict   Those who had trained in Uganda were more part of a movement with an ideology   Monique Mujawamariya reveals that a veteran soldier she spoke with "was disappointed with the avarice and meanness which prevailed among the new soldiers   He told me   They came [to join the forces] to enrich themselves and for vengeance they wanted their pay at the end of the month "[58] Mujawamariya has documented numerous incidents in which RPF soldiers are allegedly responsible for massacres thus deepening cleavages and planting seeds for future cycles of revenge

Even Defense Minister Paul Kagame has acknowledged the problem of declining discipline in a force renowned for its strict disciplinary code before assuming power   Reyntjens sees parallels to the problems faced a decade ago by the former Rwandan army, most importantly the trend of officers using their posts for commercial profit [59]

◆   *Historical Roots of Conflict*

Colonial   The Rwandan elite s manipulation of identities and social cleavages is the primary cause of the continuing conflict as well as the genocide   The social structure of Rwanda was historically "one of the most centralized and rigidly stratified anywhere in Africa "[60] Before colonization, the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" included connotations of ethnicity, lineage clan and social status, specific meanings varied in different regions of the country   The Belgian colonial authorities created rigid categories for the two groups and codified the Tutsi role of ruling group, which led to a period of Tutsi domination backed up by the Belgians [61] The roots of the recent Rwandan genocide partly rest in the fertile soil of Hutu resentment against four centuries of domination by Tutsi feudal lords

The Belgians intensified tribal divisions by educating only the Tutsi minority until the late 1940s and by making a clear distinction between the two tribes in sharing power   The Hutu majority were mostly farmers and peasants and were exploited during Belgian rule, the Tutsis were given more support by the colonial regime   Although Hutu and Tutsi both speak the same language and share a common religion and culture the Belgians created a highly segregated system ethnic division became a class division under Belgian rule

Post Colonial Political Struggle   A Hutu-led revolt eventually deposed the Tutsi ruling class and in 1962 a Hutu party won the first elections and began to run the newly independent country of Rwanda

President Juvenal Habyarimana assumed power in a *coup d etat* in 1973   His support base was primarily from Hutu in the north especially his Bagogwe clan from Ruhengeri province   During his two decades of rule this small clique centralized most of the power in the country, excluding Tutsis as well as Hutus from the south and from other clans   Within seven years of assuming power, 80 percent of the army's senior officials were from Ruhengeri province [62]

The Habyarimana regime endlessly trumpeted the 1990 RPF invasion as proof of a Tutsi plot to reestablish their hegemony in Rwanda   This message found a receptive audience in a worsening economic

environment Pronouncements by numerous Hutu leaders and the infamous *Radio Libre des Mille Collines* painted the Tutsi 'as both alien and clever " points out Lemarchand not unlike the image of the Jew in Nazi propaganda His alienness disqualifies him as a member of the national community his cleverness turns him into a permanent threat to the unsuspecting Hutu Nothing short of physical liquidation can properly deal with such danger '[6]

Hutu from the north compose an identifiable distinct sub-culture and have historically been somewhat separated from the rest of the country Lemarchand continues

> It was this critically important regional dimension in the distribution of power that inspired in the minds of the northerners a nightmarish vision of the RPF as a potential ally of Hutu politicians from the south To the image of the Hamite as an essentially alien and predatory creature was added the frightening possibility that they might join hands with the Hutu opposition and undo everything that had been accomplished since the 1973 coup [64]

> The wanton killing of Tutsi civilians became the quickest and most "rational" way of eliminating all basis for compromise with the RPF The reassertions of Hutu solidarities would soon transcend regional differences and make it virtually unthinkable for Hutu and Tutsi to agree on anything [65]

The elite Ruhengeri Hutu formed the backbone of the single legal party in Rwanda, the *Mouvement National pour la Revolution et le Developpement* (MNRD) The extremist members of this group — *akazu* (Little House in Kinyarwanda) — planned and organized the genocide The *akazu* relentlessly reminded Hutu of earlier Tutsi domination in order to channel resentment and anger into their master plan [66]

In addition to the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and MNRD officials, key elements of the Hutu leadership included

- CDR (*Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique*) — created as a parastatal organization in 1992 when Habyarimana formed the coalition government CDR brought together many of the key Hutu extremists with strong connections to the President

- *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* — MNRD and CDR respectively formed these militias in 1992 with assistance from the Presidential Guard Their public function was to protect the country from the invading RPF through a village-level defense strategy Privately they were groomed as foot soldiers for the genocide

- Network Zero — a group of officials close to the president who masterminded politically motivated assassinations

These three groups were principally responsible for a climate of increasing terror throughout 1992-1994 An International Commission of Inquiry on human rights violations in 1993 found a pattern of systematic killings of Tutsi and called the pattern "genocide," although the official report retracted this allegation

In August 1993 the Rwandan government and the RPF signed a peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania designed to pave the way to a multi-ethnic pluralistic government These political reforms threatened the ruling elite, including many extremist Hutu political and military leaders This group had opposed reforms all along and attempted to block any political change that would lessen their power

Part of the strategy of the extremists was to eliminate the problem of a multi-ethnic system by seeking a 'final solution" to political opposition   Since late 1991 several hard-line parties began mobilizing local militia and training youth militia that would later be used in massive killings of the civilian population These militias began to carry out a huge campaign of slaughter within hours of the assassination of the president   Radio broadcasts appealed to Hutus to join in the killing many did

Up to 500 000 people may have been killed   The killings were not limited to Tutsis moderate Hutus were also targeted   The motive behind the violence was political   Ethnic divisions were merely a tool of those political ambitions   The violence that occurred was not the result of "tribal warfare" but rather was caused by a small well-organized group of politicians who created an environment where genocide could be a political strategy

Economic Factors   Resource issues fueled the conflict in Rwanda   Large tracts of pastoral land in eastern Rwanda opened up when over half of the country s Tutsi population was killed or fled during conflict in the late 1950s and early 1970s   Thousands of Hutu families moved into the area   When the RPF invaded in 1990 fears were ignited over the possibility that advancing Tutsi soldiers would recapture this land Extremist Hutu politicians fed these fears

Economic stresses heightened insecurities during the five years leading up to the genocide   In 1989 the price of coffee dove fifty percent causing destitution and the first famine since 1943 in the south and southwest   Perhaps 300 000 coffee trees were uprooted and replaced with food crops   A year later the Rwandan regime devalued its currency in line with IMF requirements for its stabilization program increasing prices across the board for food, fuel and other commodities[67] Falling food production — down by a quarter during the last decade — and declining coffee prices meant escalating economic hardships especially among the younger generation who faced bleak economic futures with few options[68]

Rwanda points up some of the structural vulnerabilities in socio-economic systems throughout Africa Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa   In some regions there are over 1 000 people per square mile in many of these same areas households average little more than half a hectare   Wealthier farmers were expanding their land holdings increasing land pressure for smallholders as well as class polarization

d)   Burundi

The eighth poorest country in the world Burundi is at a critical juncture   At least 100,000 people have been killed in Burundi since October 1993   As of early 1996, an estimated 1,500 civilians are murdered each month mostly women, children and old people   The historic Tutsi elite control of the military and economy is threatened just as northern Hutu power was in Rwanda   How the Tutsi-dominated army responds to change will be the key to preventing or exacerbating violence

♦   *The Current Crisis*

Military   Violence in Burundi is episodic but sustained   In late October 1995 for example 250 Hutus in northern Burundi were killed by the army   Assassinations of Hutu officials by hit squads began increasing

as of late 1995 Civil violence and political instability have crippled the economy Amnesty International summarizes

> Burundi is experiencing a civil war and virtual anarchy characterized by widespread politically-motivated ethnic killings, ethnic cleansing — where people from either the Hutu or Tutsi ethnic group have been forced to leave particular areas through a policy of human rights abuse and intimidation — and generalized criminality Political leaders elected in June 1993 have either been killed forced into exile or rendered unable to exercise political or other control Survival has become a question of luck [69]

A Tutsi oligarchy controls the export sector and the government s patronage system These exclusionary mechanisms generate extreme tensions and are a primary cause of conflict

The state has made loans to extremist Tutsi groups directly and through banks Although the Tutsi militias are well-heeled, the national army is chronically cash poor With pay cuts for the military, soldiers have increased looting and smuggling gems and gold from Burundi to Zaire [70]

- The northwestern provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke and suburbs of Bujumbura have been the site of major clashes between the Tutsi-dominated army and the Hutu guerrilla forces infiltrating from eastern Zaire into bases in the Kibira forest This continues to create refugee flows to Zaire The army s counter-insurgency operation has left numerous *communes* burned and looted but has not driven the guerrillas out of the forest

- In response Tutsi militias increasingly collaborate with the military and are targeting their activities in Bujumbura They have increased training and recruiting to counter the Hutu propaganda spread primarily by Leonard Nyangoma s *Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie* (CNDD whose military wing is the *Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie* the FDD) The CNDD runs a short-wave radio station (*Radio Rutamarangingo*) broadcasting militant messages throughout Burundi and into the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania [71]

- The FDD militia is headquartered in Uvira, Zaire It is fighting the government primarily in the northwest and in Bujumbura Nyangoma claims that Hutu President Ntibantunganya has sacrificed Hutu interests with the final straw being Ntibantunganya's rejection of an OAU offer of a peacekeeping force to monitor the army [72]

- The other major Hutu militia, *Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu* (*Palipehutu*) maintains a much lower profile[73], but has operated out of Rwanda and Tanzania for years

On a local level, militias have undertaken what Amnesty International calls ethnic cleansing operations, especially against Hutus in Bujumbura and elsewhere Amnesty suggests that the army uses attacks against soldiers as the pretext for killing civilians Frequently Tutsi militia and the military "act in concert "[74] Amnesty concludes that the "President and his allies are unable to exercise any control over the armed forces "[75] Human Rights Watch corroborates this conclusion "Through a combination of violence intimidation and blockage Tutsi-dominated factions re-appropriated the political control they had lost at the polls in June 1993 "[76]

The army can no longer kill without retribution because of the increasingly organized and armed Hutu militia Thousands of Tutsi were killed in the carnage which followed the assassination of the President in October 1993 Extremists in both the Tutsi-dominated military and the Hutu militias are extremely well armed thanks to an influx of arms in the middle of 1995 [77] Civilians are also buying large numbers of weapons privately

Army forces in the northwest using heavy weapons are being trained by North Korean military advisors although the President claimed the instructors are martial arts trainers Chinese weapons also were delivered in late 1995 to the government This extends a long history of interest by China and North Korea in the region [78]

The deep political and ethnic divisions benefit the military and its supporters more than any other group Until the military is integrated it is unlikely that the cycle of impunity can be addressed and progress can be made in sharing political power But Tutsis see the army as their primary protectors a perception fed by the genocide in Rwanda

The UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Paulo Pinheiro, estimated that Hutu rebels killed up to four soldiers daily in mid-1995 and that roughly 200 civilians per week are murdered in political violence Mostly Hutu peasants were killed by the army or Tutsi militia (*Sans Echec* and *Sans Defaite*) in "reprisal" attacks *Sans Echec* is a band of young terrorists allegedly backed by the army [79]

In a telling statistic, *Medecins sans Frontieres* has found that civil conflict produces an average ratio of four wounded to one dead globally In Burundi the organization found the ratio to be one wounded to every 15-20 dead Almost half are women and children

Over 90 percent of senior military officers come from Bururi Province in the south All are Hima-Tutsi Many have been accused of crimes but have not lost their commissions Over half of the rank-and-file are Hima-Tutsi from Bururi cementing officers and soldiers in a network of authoritarianism and impunity The number of Hutu soldiers in the army is minuscule [80]

Criminality and violence have rapidly increased Burundi and, as in other conflicts in the Greater Horn have become inextricably linked to the political conflict Quite often, militias which attack on the basis of politics also loot Many have become involved in networks of banditry

Extremists on both sides broadcast their message especially through "hate radio" or private newspapers which have proliferated since 1992 [81]

Political The June 1993 elections brought the predominantly Hutu FRODEBU (*Front pour la Democratie au Burundi*) to an overwhelming victory Despite this real power in Burundi is in the hands of the military and certain ministers of the mostly Tutsi UPRONA (*Union pour le Progres National*) such as Prime Minister Antoine Nduwayo They have successfully marginalized the Hutu power base [82] The divide between Tutsi and Hutu has widened with political moderation a victim of this polarization The Tutsi grip on power is fueled by memories of the genocide in neighboring Rwanda

Hutus deeply resent the loss of the authority they appeared to have won in the 1993 elections The extremists hands on both sides are strengthened when the political process denies true power-sharing The Tutsi point of view is predictable the minority needs military predominance to protect itself

The Tutsi fear of change has paralyzed the coalition government created under the September 1994 power-sharing agreement Each side accuses the other of culpability in the now frequent massacres In October 1995 after weeks of coalition government paralysis a reshuffle removed hardliners from both the Hutu *Mouvance Presidentielle* (presidential movement) and the Tutsi opposition Ethnic balance was maintained by appointing ministers from the Tutsi UPRONA and the Hutu FRODEBU

The fundamental conundrum facing Burundi is how to create an environment in which both Tutsi and Hutu feel secure Both groups fear the other s intentions The Rwandan genocide and subsequent change of power have heightened insecurity in Burundi Mechanisms of both institutional and physical protection will be necessary [85]

◆   *Historical Roots*

Burundi was absorbed into German East Africa in 1899 after centuries of being administered as a kingdom After World War I the Belgians took control of Burundi and remained until independence in 1962

In the mid-1960s, the monarchy was abolished and Hutu officers and politicians were subsequently purged *en masse* After an unsuccessful *coup* attempt in 1972 up to 200,000 Hutus were massacred and all Hutus were removed from the army There were major refugee movements into neighboring countries principally Tanzania For most of the next two decades, military regimes backed by a small Tutsi elite ruled Burundi

From the mid-1960s, Tutsi leaders increasingly concentrated political power in Burundi They cornered opportunities in employment, education property and credit sometimes at the direct expense of Hutu populations During the late 1980s and the early 1990s President Pierre Buyoya attempted to institute reforms in the system, bringing Hutu into the government and army and opening up the educational system to more opportunities for Hutus Nevertheless Buyoya lost the 1993 elections and only a small opening had been put in the Tutsi control of the military, judiciary, and public administration

In the 1993 elections Hutu intellectual Melchior Ndadaye and FRODEBU swept to victory Thousands of Hutu refugees returned home to Burundi in the months following the election, overwhelming government capacity to deal with needs and disputes [84]

But on October 23 1993 extremists in the military assassinated Ndadaye and other high-ranking FRODEBU officials sparking off spiraling political and ethnic violence which killed at least 50 000 people and displaced 700 000 more Most were Hutu Government requests for UN peacekeeping forces were denied In January 1994, FRODEBU member Cyprien Ntaryamira was named interim president but he died in the same plane crash as Rwanda's president Yet another FRODEBU member has replaced Ntaryamira as interim president, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya

2   Countries with Medium Potential for Conflict

a)   Ethiopia

Ethiopia emerged in mid-1991 from a bloody, decades-long war which resulted in the overthrow of the highly authoritarian Derg regime, independence for Eritrea, and the ascension to power of the Ethiopian

People s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) Although the EPRDF is largely dominated by the Tigrayan People s Liberation Front (TPLF) the EPRDF has non-Tigrayan members and key positions in the justice and economic ministries are held by non-TPLF members

A four-year transition ensued national elections were held in mid-1995 While there has been sporadic localized conflict in some regions during the past five years Ethiopia has remained relatively peaceful Peace has brought a flowering of private commercial enterprise markets are better supplied than at any time during the Derg rule Some analysts see the increase in private sector development as a key to preventing future conflict

♦   *Transition Period*

Obstacles to reconciliation between the government and opposition groups during the transition included

- EPRDF (Ethiopian People s Revolutionary Democratic Front) domination of the national military police and electronic media

- The EPRDF's replacement of numerous civil servants a normal exercise for any change of government but presented as "proof" of growing autocracy by some of the opposition parties

- The perception of many opposition parties that the EPRDF was attempting to divide and control major social organizations such as unions peace groups political parties and religious bodies a claim for which there is very uneven evidence

In their 1995 annual report Human Rights Watch concluded

> The Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political Meeting Proclamation (Proclamation No 3 1991)
> which guarantees the right to peaceful demonstration and public political meetings was largely
> ignored or misinterpreted depending on the region in which an application is made The fairness of
> the political process continued to be a cause for concern It became increasingly difficult to
> distinguish between the EPRDF as a political party and the EPRDF as the government in power [85]

In addition to Human Rights Watch s criticisms Amnesty International and local human rights groups have documented detentions, extrajudicial executions secret detention centers, and impunity for soldiers

During the transition, some groups perceived the government military forces as an occupation army — understandably, since TPLF forces operated only in the north before 1991 In some areas EPRDF actions caused local problems, usually caused by acts by regional and local civilian administrators These administrations were responsible for much of the alleged intimidation, imprisonment and execution of political opponents

It is impossible to judge whether the central government sanctioned these actions, but it seems that much of the abuse can be attributed to local initiative and enthusiasm However, since the top official in each region during the transition was usually an EPRDF representative some hierarchical culpability is probable The abuse of political opponents was a factor contributing to pushing most of the major political parties out of

the electoral process By the 1992 local and regional elections most opposition groups were boycotting the process This boycott continues

- The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) left the political process for a complex set of reasons including harassment and intimidation throughout Region Four favoritism shown to the Oromo People s Democratic Organization (OPDO) by the EPRDF a long history of disagreement and rivalry with the TPLF a perception by the OLF that they would lose elections and that agreements negotiated in 1991 had given the EPRDF the political upper hand

- The Southern Coalition was removed from the government after it signed a resolution calling for the formation of a new government

- The All Amhara People s Organization (AAPO) is the youngest of these major groups and its leader Professor Asrat Woldeyes, has been in prison since July 1994 because of his inflammatory writings and speeches which the government felt incited ethnic hatred

There is mixed reaction to the regionalization policy which devolved administrative responsibilities to ten regions based on nationalities This "ethnic federalism" created regional administrations which are formed largely on the basis of ethnic affiliation Supporters are encouraged by the recognition of local languages and cultures, welcome the breathing room from a history of Amhara domination, and believe overcentralization to be impractical in such a huge populous country The EPRDF views "ethnic federalism" as a means not an end it represents their attempt to prevent a single economic class from dominating the poor majority The hope is that decentralizing the economy will lead to decentralized politics On the other hand detractors say that ethnic politics threatens peace, fails to protect minority rights and has increased divisions among different groups living in the same region

While it is true that ethnic tensions have worsened in some places they have declined in others At this point it is too early to judge whether ethnic federalism is the invitation to armageddon that critics say or is the benign solution that advocates proclaim

Government restrictions on election observers inhibited the process and integrity of election monitoring during the 1995 national elections These restrictions were in effect endorsed by the embassies of most major donor countries as their Donor Election Unit (DEU) coopted the independent sector in monitoring the elections and then labelled the elections free and fair despite the cautions of Unit staff [86]

The DEU found that the major opposition parties registered but boycotting the election, all faced "political intimidation arrest and the closure of their offices in the pre-election period " The withdrawal of the Southern Coalition AAPO and OLF left little in the way of serious opposition to the EPRDF, especially in Regions One Three Four and the Southern Region None of these parties' popularity has been tested by an election nevertheless, they all offered a clear alternative to the EPRDF in the major regions of Ethiopia [87] Though less organized the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party experienced similar problems, including closure of offices and imprisonment of leaders [88]

The DEU also concluded that the EPRDF was extremely effective in mobilizing rural populations, accounting for 85 percent of Ethiopians Intimidation was an ever-present factor for non-EPRDF candidates in rural constituencies [89] Those smaller parties which did participate were usually disorganized, intimidations and restrictions from local officials effectively disrupted their campaigns, and they offered

little challenge to the EPRDF [90] Despite this it is clear that the EPRDF does enjoy considerable popularity in many rural areas throughout Ethiopia even taking into account as one observer noted "ordinary peoples willingness to go along in order to get along

Ethiopia quickly acceded to donor demands in 1991 for a multi-party transition but backtracked continuously during the four years of the transition The election processes have largely been window-dressing for donors while the EPRDF proceeds with its own internal version of democratization

Many analysts fault the EPRDF for its "emphasis on democratization as a purely formal process' which actually undermines long-term democratic processes [91] But this line of analysis usually ignores the participatory structures the EPRDF is developing at the local level as well as the process of devolving administrative power away from the center It also gives short shrift to the different vision of participation shared by governments such as those in Ethiopia Uganda and Eritrea as opposed to models urged by Western proponents of multi-partyism

Ethiopia had been over-centralized for decades The government felt that in order to move forward with any political liberalization process it had to dismantle that centralized empire-state The government believed that if it let go of the reins in certain regions, the country would have splintered, especially in Regions Four and Five The government needed to rely on satellite allies to maintain control over the process of decentralization

Arguably Ethiopia liberalized and opened the door for regional secession (beyond Eritrea) too quickly Sensing the loss of control of the process by early 1992, the EPRDF began pulling back from a free-for-all democratic process and created conditions which made it extremely difficult for already nervous opposition parties to remain in the process Now that the transition is over with the EPRDF entrenched in the center and its satellite parties paramount in key regions, it is possible that the system will slowly reopen The end of the transition process found the EPRDF's primary goal accomplished the consolidation of its power in the system it envisioned creating nearly two decades ago

Perhaps the largest stumbling block to major progress on breaking the logjam between political parties is the lack of willingness on the part of the opposition to participate in the political process as well as the refusal of several groups to renounce violence Despite negotiations brokered by Western diplomats to release some political prisoners and opposition access to media the opposition boycott of the electoral process continued Those opting out of the process have guaranteed themselves political marginalization for the next five years as a result

♦   *Post-Transition Potential for Conflict*

As stated the opting out of the major opposition groups is the most challenging problem for the post-transition process The failure to generate a loyal opposition has resulted in numerous groups who oppose the EPRDF but lack substantive alternatives The Economist Intelligence Unit comments

> Verbal attacks on the government will continue with increasing vehemence from urban, self-styled opposition organizations and groups of exiled Ethiopians predominantly from the large diaspora in the US Both groups will continue to repudiate angrily the legitimacy of the current set-up while offering no practical alternative policies to address the myriad of problems afflicting the population

Such forces will continue to play on the deep malaise and uncertainty created by both regional restructuring and market reforms particularly in Addis Ababa [9-]

One structural problem for the future of the Ethiopian political process is the major opposition parties perception that they have no legal means by which they can participate freely and gain power Another is the division and fragmentation of the opposition itself making it more unlikely that huge blocs of political opponents will re-enter the legal process

Furthermore ethnic federalism may contain ethnicity as a long-term producer of conflict at the national level or it may spark it It is too early to judge Nevertheless, ethnic conflict is not simply a product of the transition There is a long history of intercommunal competition and/or violence in many areas of Ethiopia It is not surprising that a reform process as significant as the regionalization policy would exacerbate already existing tensions

Another potential source of human rights problems in some of the regions is less central control of the police and judiciary A particular flashpoint for violence in some places will be over-taxation, especially where roadblocks are being established to collect duties Nevertheless implementation of regional spending and taxing plans have gone more smoothly than expected to date Future problems will likely center around land disputes regional taxing power, transfer of funds from the center to the regions, and restructuring of the government army to reflect the makeup of society

The current potential for conflict in Ethiopia is cloudy There is no consensus about the support of OLF and AAPO the two organizations most likely to challenge the Ethiopian government in the future There is little credible analysis of what level of armed resistance these and other organizations might offer The government s army is now strong, political support for the government is fairly widespread among the peasantry and the donor countries are in the government s corner Thus, major armed conflict is extremely unlikely at the national level in the near future Region Four, Oromia, will be discussed further in the following section on sub-national conflict Region Five the Somali Region, is perpetually unstable regardless of policy initiatives emanating from Addis

Part of the brilliance of the regionalization policy was that it regionalized conflict that might have been directed at the national level In Region Four OLF, IFLO and OPDO have battled each other at times, with the EPRDF forces involved in low-intensity counter-insurgency operations against OLF positions In Region Five the ESDL and ONLF battle politically, while military confrontations between the EPRDF and ONLF and between the ONLF and the Islamic group in the region occur sporadically

Redrawing boundaries according to ethnicity has been problematic People have been forced from lands their families have owned for generations Ethnic claims over minerals, lands, and water will continue to be explosive issues In some cases ethnic segregation imposed from the top is resisted by peoples of different ethnicities who have coexisted peacefully for many generations In other cases, longstanding ethnic tensions have been exacerbated In yet other areas, tensions have been reduced because of increased commerce and access to decision-making structures

Nevertheless, there is danger in policies that rigidify peoples' identities, even if that is not the explicit intent Mistakes made in this area are difficult to reverse Hizkias Assefa refers to the example of the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi [9-] This is a common analogy drawn by opponents of the current government in Addis

Rapid urbanization is a potential destabilizing force The rural-urban influx results partly from the years of limited mobility during the Derg a policy which changed under this government It is also caused by the perception of violence targeting minorities

Another issue which holds the potential for conflict is refugee repatriation Roughly 300 000 Ethiopians live in Sudan and with the deterioration in relations between Ethiopia and Sudan the refugees have become vulnerable to potential expulsion If an exodus is rapid it could be destabilizing for Ethiopia There is also the potential for infiltration of any refugee influx by Islamic militants looking to destabilize the Ethiopian government

Conflict is perhaps most endemic in Region Five where the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) other political parties, and Islamic organizations are all vying for power Human Rights Watch says this conflict "threatens future peace and stability in the country "[94] In mid-1994 there was major conflict in the Region when the Western Somali Liberation Front and the ONLF were defeated by the EPRDF military reducing the two groups to occasional guerilla activity There is sporadic conflict in numerous other areas including Harar, Bale Wollega northern Shoa, and Gondar

Since Kenya s reduction or termination of support to the OLF and the IFLO speculation centers on the potential role of the NIF regime in Sudan in sustaining destabilization in Ethiopia through possible sponsorship of IFLO OLF or renegade splinter groups from either organization The degree to which Islamic communities offer fertile ground for fundamentalist destabilization in Ethiopia is unknown especially Regions Four and Five

♦   *Historical Context*

After the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Derg consolidated power by 1975, the same year in which the TPLF was formed In the mid-1980s, the TPLF formed the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) part of a larger strategy to expand its influence beyond Tigray The MLLT was envisioned as a party which could affiliate with similar organizations in other parts of Ethiopia to form a coalition party at the national level This far-sighted strategy laid the groundwork for the creation of smaller movements in key regions (Amhara Oromo, and Southern) which became affiliated with the TPLF eventually forming the Ethiopian People s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)

The first two months of 1989 witnessed the launch of one of the TPLF's most successful offensives effectively taking control of all of Tigray save one government outpost at Maichew This period also saw the TPLF and the EPDM merge to form the EPRDF As a direct challenge to the Oromo Liberation Front the TPLF created a new Oromo organization, the Oromo People s Democratic Organization which also folded under the EPRDF umbrella By the end of 1989 the EPRDF had surged through parts of Wollo and had taken towns in northern Shewa and southern Gonder [95]

The EPRDF launched a massive offensive in February 1991 which in only two weeks liberated all of Gonder and Gojjam from government troops By May 1991 the EPRDF had reached the outskirts of Addis Ababa, and the EPLF had tightened its siege of Asmara garrison which finally surrendered on May 25 Three days later the EPRDF marched largely unopposed into Addis

The EPRDF assumed power in Addis after the fall of the Derg This coalition continues to rule today and as the TPLF envisioned in the mid-1980s has undercut the appeal of the regionally-based political movements specifically AAPO OLF and the Southern Coalition

b)   Kenya

Although violent and non-violent conflict in Kenya usually follows communal identity deeper causes lie in inequalities in access to resources class differences and power struggles among political elites

Kenya has a complex history of ethnic cleavages which have evolved and have had political effects Pre-colonial Kenya was largely composed of ethnically homogenous areas with occasional intercommunal conflict During the colonial period divide-and-rule policies established ethnically distinct regions and ethnic favoritism in land holdings The anti-colonial Mau Mau insurgency in the 1950s was largely Kikuvu and caused an intensification of the British authority s divisive policies Independent Kenya s first president Jomo Kenyatta continued the policy of legitimizing ethnic-based political organization favoring the Kikuvu

His successor President Daniel arap-Moi has promoted the interests of the Kalenjin population and allied groups at Kikuyu expense despite the latter s predominance in land ownership civil service trade and industry Many leaders of the opposition parties are Kikuvu and at times appeal openly to ethnic sentiments The opposition represents a broad array of ethnic and other groups supported by a growing middle class and grew in strength as Moi constructed an increasingly repressive state [96] But even as Moi vielded to external pressure to liberalize the political system culminating in the 1993 presidential elections opposition fragmented along various lines some ethnic and regional

Once unleashed by liberalization in Kenya, civil society s diverse groupings have only offered a "limited challenge to arbitrary rule and may be very divided against itself"[97]

There are three main opposition parties FORD-Kenya FORD-Asili and the Democratic Party FORD stands for the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy and was the coalition which campaigned for an end to one-party rule but which splintered after its original objective was met mostly along ethnic lines All opposition parties have experienced further internal splits

Safina is the most recent group to form, but as yet the government has prevented its registration as a political party perhaps fearing its internal appeal and external fundraising potential given its leader Dr Richard Leakev s prominent position To add emphasis to the government s displeasure with *Safina* Dr Leakev was bull-whipped by supporters of Kenya African National Union (KANU the governing party) in Nakuru in mid-1995

Parties preparing to campaign in the 1997 national elections face more difficult conditions than in 1992 Major legal and constitutional obstacles constrain civic engagement political party competition and the electoral process Failure to reform electoral laws well in advance of the elections "may trigger an opposition boycott and considerable election and post-election violence"[98] Such reforms would include changing the winner-take-all electoral formula and legal codes protecting rights to assembly and free speech

KANU is experiencing behind-the-scenes struggles within the party for post-Moi power The party splits across generational lines with divisions from ethnic feuds in the Kalenjin group of tribes and its allied ethnic groups The generational group most connected to Moi includes Nicholas Biwott (a Kalenjin businessman) and William Ntimama (a Masai government minister) Moi's most trusted lieutenants who want to deny succession to Vice-President George Saitoti

Moi's trusted lieutenants confidants and business aides have been unable to agree on a post-Moi candidate Their fallback plan is a federal (*majimbo*) state with great autonomy for the Rift Valley Province The government is building the controversial Eldoret International Airport (plans for which were recently scaled back) to eliminate the Rift Valley's dependence on Nairobi for international travel Kalenjin KANU leaders are nervous about post-Moi reprisal by groups who have suffered ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley especially Kikuvu Latiya and Luo [99] The Rift Valley conflict will be specifically discussed below

In 1995 human rights organizations reported a serious deterioration in Kenya The government has cracked down on opposition and civic groups as well as on internally displaced populations

c)   Uganda

Uganda was ripped apart by conflict and massive human rights violations under both Milton Obote and Idi Amin Since the ascension of Yoweri Museveni s government — what Gilbert Khadiagala calls a "soft authoritarian alliance" — Uganda has progressed rapidly from the Obote/Amin era of protracted civil conflict [100]

Museveni s National Resistance Army (NRA) forces have contained rebel activity in the east and north of the country during the first five years of his rule The methods employed left lingering resentment and the specter of conflict in the north has arisen again

♦   *Debate Over Governance*

By mid-1995 the chorus of internal and external voices urging multi-partyism had intensified For example, as the US Embassy noted in May 1995

> The history of Uganda, like the history of other countries shows the undesirable often tragic consequences of governments which do not allow political competition and which deny human rights [101]

Internally, the government advocates extending the no-party Movement system The government position was reflected in the Constituent Assembly's June 1995 decision to hold a referendum on multi-party politics in 1999

The debate has opened up larger issues of political freedom and basic rights of speech and assembly and threatens to turn violent In July 1995 for example opponents of multi-partyism disrupted a meeting organized by multi-party supporters Furthermore the government s reshuffle in November 1994 eliminated

the delicate balancing act Museveni had carried on for years by stacking the new government with NRM loyalists [102]

The NRA leadership is mostly made up of soldiers from the pastoral Hima caste from Ankole in Western Uganda reflecting the NRA s roots as an alliance of southern and western groups against northern domination Many officers from Ankole support the restoration of the traditional Hima kings and so find themselves allied with Baganda demands for re-empowering the Kabaka the Baganda monarch whose title is restored but who maintains only ceremonial powers The government is bedeviled by continuing demands from Buganda for federal status Museveni counters that these are merely 'symbolic remnants of the past " a position which irks traditionalists, including key officers in the NRA such as Major General David Tinyefuza [103]

Presidential elections in the "no-party system" have been delayed until June 1996 Contenders to the presidency will be the heavily favored Museveni the Democratic Party s Paul Ssemogerere and the Uganda People s Congress Adonia Tiberondwa

♦   *Conflict*

Conflict has been escalating between Uganda and Sudan since 1994 Partially in response to the Ugandan government s support of the SPLA the NIF regime in Khartoum has increased its support for two rebel groups in northern Uganda

- The Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), headed by Joseph Kony and primarily Acholi

- The West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), led by Juma Oris mostly Kakwa and Aringa

Both attack targets in their own areas and both launch attacks from Sudanese territory and retreat there afterward
Ugandan army officers are advocating a much more aggressive approach to the northern rebels, including authority to pursue them into Sudan

The LRA s ideology is ironically one of Christian fundamentalism holding that Uganda should be ruled by a strict interpretation of the Ten Commandments An upsurge in LRA activities in early 1995 led Museveni to cut diplomatic relations with Sudan in March of that year

Joseph Kony surfaced in the late 1980s as head of the Uganda Christian Democratic Army an Acholi group which operated in Gulu and Kitgum districts wreaking havoc on civilians and picking up the mantle of Acholi leadership from the defeated Alice Lackwanna and her Holy Spirit Movement Ugandan government forces led by Major General David Tinyefuza unleashed a search-and-destroy military campaign in 1991[104] to eradicate this and other remnants of resistance Rebel soldiers were hunted down and civilians were often interned in large holding camps until the operations were completed

Some analysts express fear that northern Uganda features the elements of structural violence Economic inequalities worsen ongoing insecurity in the north coincides with continuing development in the south [105]

Museveni s administration has been unable to address significantly the economic imbalance between north and south With the pressure to increase foreign exchange Uganda has focused on further developing the export sector This has invariably meant intensifying agriculture in the south leaving little investment for northern initiatives[106]

British colonists extended the fewest privileges to northern Uganda There was little economic investment and the north was exploited as a reserve of cheap labor for southern ventures There was little governmental administrative presence in Karamoja West Nile and Madi regions during the sixty years of colonial authority[107]

In post-independence Uganda power shifted from the colonially-favored Buganda Region to the Northern Region For most of the first two decades following independence, Milton Obote (1963-1971 1980-1985) and Idi Amin (1971-1979) ruled Uganda Both are from the north

Yet another rebel group, the National Democratic Army (NDA), went public in early 1995, demanding federal status for Buganda region Two years earlier Museveni had allowed the resuscitation of the four kingdoms which Milton Obote had outlawed in 1967 This "whetted the appetites of Baganda monarchists for full power " and when the Constituent Assembly denied federal status to Buganda the NDA emerged in the southwest and threatened war[108]

The NDA is led by Major Herbert Itongwa a deserter and bandit who is attempting to recruit demobilized soldiers and government workers who have been laid off due to economic reform programs[109] Early in 1995 the NDA attacked a number of police stations, killing policemen and seizing weapons They also kidnapped the Minister of Health for a week Since then four of the NDA s key officers have been killed and thirteen more have defected Their platform of extreme federalism bordering on secession does not have widespread support in Baganda areas Museveni s coalition government includes key Baganda in important positions further blunting the NDA s support base The NDA and other groups can cause localized insecurity but do not represent a serious challenge to Museveni s control of government[110]

3   Countries with Low Potential for Future Conflict

a)   Tanzania

There are over 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania yet larger groups live far enough apart that they do not compete constantly for resources No single group is sufficiently large to dominate the others Former President Julius Nyerere, who hails from one of the smallest ethnic groups in Tanzania, was key in establishing a national framework which favored national identity over ethnicity and actively sought to prevent marginalization of smaller groups

- Nyerere made Swahili the national language with no tribal languages taught in schools

- Local chiefs were disempowered

- Civil servants were not allowed to work in their home areas promoting integration and obviating opportunities for the establishment of parochial fiefdoms by government officials[111]

The commercial sector has long been dominated by the Asian (Indian) community. A long recession has increased African populations resentment of Asians in Tanzania. The potential for violence exists and references are occasionally made about the Ugandan purge of its Asian community during Idi Amin's reign.

Extremists call for the deportation of Asian businessmen. Fearing that Asians businessmen would corner markets the Tanzanian government has delayed a privatization plan to sell off many publicly owned companies. Typical sentiment is expressed by Tanzanian businessman Donat Mgeta. 'The tensions will increase if something is not done. We cannot continue to have a system in which the Asians have three Mercedes in one family and I cannot afford to give my children bus fare to go to school."[112] It is important to note that most politicians — especially from opposition parties — who played this anti-Asian card did not win seats in the election.

On the mainland increasingly nasty rhetoric is directed at Islam. Rev. Christopher Mtikila the popular leader of the unregistered Democratic Party is a "fundamentalist" Christian and a leading proponent of anti-Asian sentiment.

Elections were held in November 1995 and despite charges of fraud and an unsuccessful lawsuit by opposition figures to have the results thrown out the ruling party won over 60 percent of the vote and Benjamin Mkapa assumed the presidency. Some opposition members have taken their seats in Parliament.

A potential area of serious conflict is the governing arrangement for Zanzibar the Indian Ocean island united with Tanganyika in 1964 to create modern-day Tanzania. Zanzibar has its own president and parliament in an autonomous relationship with the mainland. Noises for separatism have always been heard on the island and rose a decibel in the run-up to the elections. Over 50 members of Parliament from the mainland openly advocate separation between Zanzibar and the mainland.[11]

Envoys reported "serious irregularities" in the regional elections on Zanzibar opposition party members claimed the process was fraudulent.[114] After the flawed polling the Electoral Commission pronounced the ruling party a narrow winner in Zanzibar. The relationship between Zanzibar and the mainland has been damaged by the election process. CCM credibility has been eroded by charges of election fraud in Zanzibar.[115] The final tally is considered improper by most donor governments thus affecting aid. The ruling party CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*) candidate President Salmin Amour was announced to have won by 1500 votes. The Zanzibari opposition have refused to take their seats despite having won almost half of them. President Amour has made no effort to bring the opposition into government.

There is growing nationalism in Zanzibar coinciding with the CCM's deterioration. Some analysts predict serious conflict if Zanzibar does not get more autonomy. Ten years ago, the islands comprising Zanzibar produced the spices that made up the bulk of Tanzania's foreign exchange. As the islands economic fortunes declined mobilization has increased based on religion and nationalism.[116] There is growing tension between those who live on the main island in Zanzibar, where the CCM drew much of its support and the smaller island of Pemba where the opposition received the bulk of its votes. The latter perceives discrimination from the former another factor which may contribute to conflict in Zanzibar.

A further potential source of destabilization and conflict on the Tanzanian mainland is the presence of hundreds of thousands of Burundian and Rwandan refugees. Besides creating a strain on resources concentrations of refugees provide haven for extremists plotting cross-border incursions and other destabilizing activities. Hundreds of Tanzanians have been reported to have been raped, robbed or killed.

by Rwandan or Burundi refugees   Tensions between the governments of Tanzania and Burundi have been exacerbated by incursions by the Burundi army into Tanzania [117]

b)   Eritrea

The victorious movement which swept the Derg out of Eritrea decided not to institute a multi-party framework during its transition period   The Eritrean People s Liberation Front (EPLF) has since changed its name to the People s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), but it has not wavered on the issue of multi-partyism

Eritrea's religious and ethnic heterogeneity mean that the government will have to tread delicately around many social fault lines in order to avoid conflict   The PFDJ's concentration of political and economic power is a primary concern   The PFDJ firmly controls the reins of government at all levels   The PFDJ is also the country's main economic player   as it directly invests in private businesses in exchange for 51 percent ownership   All major Eritrean companies have the PFDJ hand at the wheel   be it public or private   Land is government-owned   leading to the usual charges of favoritism in distribution for pro-government people   This is especially true in the west, where 2,000 ex-fighters who received land were met with violence with some deaths [118]

Two groups are active in the west   providing an additional source of potential conflict   These are the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), run by Abdullah Idriss   and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad   Both groups receive unknown amounts of support from the Sudanese government and from Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan   Analysts are concerned that this support could lead to short-term conflict, possibly aggravated by the potentially destabilizing issue of the role of Islam in the state   As the honeymoon of independence wears off and the economy does not meet unrealistic expectations, these groups could gain support

The Eritrean independence movement always had significant fissures along ethnic, religious, and regional lines   Initially the Eritrean Liberation Front of the early 1960s was solely Muslim   A decade later, the founding of the EPLF gave voice to Christian dissent against Ethiopia, although the EPLF was and is not an exclusively Christian movement

War between the ELF and EPLF raged for a decade and featured ethnic, religious, generational, and regional factors in addition to ideology   The ELF's defeat predated the successful quest for independence by a decade   Markakis concludes,

> The outcome of a conflict that began on a parochial basis, therefore, is a new state with a multi-ethnic population whose 'national' (Eritrean) consciousness was forged in a bloody struggle that lasted three decades [119]

The destruction of an already narrow resource base adds an   potential economic instability   War tactics that wrought extensive environmental damage above and beyond Eritrea's natural disasters (such as locust infestation) include

- The bombing of civilian targets

- The use of napalm and chemical defoliants

- Scorched-earth bush clearance to remove ground cover for the Fronts

- Increased demand for fuelwood around army garrison towns

- Use of depth charges by Soviet trawlers to harvest fish in the Red Sea

- Concentrating civilians around security hamlets

Continuing soil erosion deforestation and overgrazing add devastation of the ecological and subsistence base

Another potentially exacerbating factor is the extent and rate of increase of unemployment A third of all civil servants have been laid off during the transition roughly 3 000 of these were ex-EPLF fighters demobilized into the civil service Further demobilization will throw more Eritreans into the ranks of the unemployed [120]

c) Djibouti

After a protracted armed struggle against the government, the rebel Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) signed a peace agreement with the government in late 1994 Djibouti s constitution allows it and others to become a political party a process which FRUD has not yet undertaken

FRUD is primarily an Afar movement, while the government is dominated by Somali Issas In late June 1995 assassins killed a key FRUD supporter of the peace process Ali Houmed Soule Anti-peace elements of the army were suspected as they have been in other acts of terrorism such as the bombing of a restaurant in early August Despite this provocation FRUD members who are part of the coalition government remained committed to the peace agreement [121]

Northern Djibouti remains unstable, the government has not asserted its authority in that area due to financial constraints Violence is not common

The peace accord allowed for the entry of FRUD members into the government but only two FRUD members have been brought into the governing structure Opposition members in Djibouti dismiss this as cosmetic and reject the multi-party label for this government [122]

The major brewing conflict is over presidential succession after the aging Hassan Gouled Aptidon leaves office Key Issa politicians are positioning themselves for a post-Aptidon takeover The front runner is the hardliner *chef de cabinet* Ismael Omar Guelleh [123] Some analysts predict inter-clan conflict for the coming transition

France has a force of 3 250 troops based in Djibouti including armored artillery and infantry battalions The French air force is significant anchored by Puma helicopters and Mirage fighter jets [124] Djibouti remains strategic because of its location at the mouth of the Red Sea through which transits a significant amount of Gulf oil exports

C   Sub-National-Level Conflict in the Greater Horn

Local dynamics of violence must not be forgotten even in the context of serious regional-level crises and national-level conflicts   In the Horn for elders and chiefs, for local commanders of government and rebel armies for militia mercenaries local conflict often takes precedence over all other conflicts   Opportunities for asset-stripping and revenge often dictate relations and local warlordism is a problem in some places

Local strife is often more destructive and deadly for civilian populations than national-level conflict   While sub-national conflicts usually have a tie to national wars they have lives and logical frameworks of their own for which national level peace efforts are irrelevant

Five illustrative cases will be examined the Jonglei region of southern Sudan, the Rift Valley Province of Kenya, Region Four (Oromia) in Ethiopia prefecture-level resettlement problems in Rwanda and the Juba Valley in Somalia   There are numerous other cases which could be explored

a)   Jonglei Province (Southern Sudan)[125]

The Nuer incursions into Dinka territory in the Jonglei region in late 1991 laid the most recent foundation for the current civil conflict's ferocity in southern Sudan   Soon after the split within the SPLA in which Riek Machar and many Nuer soldiers announced a coup against John Garang, Garang dispatched a small contingent of soldiers commanded by William Nyoun Bany to Ayod   They were quickly beaten back toward Kongor   Afterwards, the splinter faction (SPLA-Nasir) and Nuer militia counter-attacked in two waves   One in September 1991 went only as far as Kongor, the second, in November 1991 advanced deep into Dinka territory south of Bor

The troops of the SPLA-Nasir faction were joined by soldiers from Anyanya 2, a Nuer militia which had fought the SPLA from 1983 to 1987 and then splintered apart, some of its remnants joining the SPLA and others becoming a government-supported paramilitary force operating out of Malakal   Also entering the fray were thousands of Nuer civilians from northern Upper Nile, known as the "White Army" or "Decbor " The Nasir faction commanders were either unable or unwilling to control the Anyanya 2 and White Army personnel which made up the vast majority of the attacking forces   Their primary objectives were looting and revenge for earlier SPLA atrocities

The results were catastrophic

> An estimated 30,000 Nuer rampaged through the area, burning and killing, leveling hospitals and
> clinics, destroying crops and stores, killing cattle, and creating chaos throughout the district   In
> December, the UN reported that 'more than 200,000 residents of the Bor and Kongor districts in an
> exodus unlike anything seen before in Sudan, fled south in search of food, shelter, and security [126]

Although final estimates vary widely, as many as 5 000 people may have been killed [127] Besides being shot, Dinka civilians were "speared or garrotted — and in a particularly creative act of cruelty, thousands of cattle were blinded with pangas "[128]

The destruction or large-scale raiding of cattle devastated the subsistence base and livelihoods of thousands of families in Bor and Kongor districts   Before the attacks, Norwegian People's Aid had estimated that

nearly 400,000 head of cattle populated the area By January 1992 the number had plummeted to 50 000 This destruction of the Dinka population s asset base in the Upper Nile parallels a similar campaign of asset-stripping that the government-financed Arab Baggara militia carried out in 1987-1988 in another Dinka population center northern Bahr al-Ghazal [19] Illustrating the resulting destitution one relief official observed that people of the region "used to wear bright clothes or *jellabias* they are now naked or in rags "

The Nasir faction chose to launch an attack on the Kongor area so soon after the split for a number of reasons Riek Machar had expected many of the other SPLA commanders to join his faction When this did not happen he attacked Kongor to preempt a strike by Garang[10] and to defeat Garang in his home territory so that undecided commanders would join the Nasir faction The underlying philosophy was summarized by a Commander from Lafon "By destroying the civilians you are breaking the enemy s power "

The Nasir faction found eager cohorts for the two offensives in Anyanya 2 and the Nuer communities which provided White Army forces Anyanya 2 had suffered numerous defeats at the hands of the SPLA until 1987 and were eager for an opportunity for revenge SPLA reprisals against Anyanya 2 operational areas had often targeted Nuer civilians Aside from actual attacks these areas had been heavily taxed by the SPLA and were constantly victimized by SPLA atrocities such as looting food, taking young women to be wives of soldiers and forced recruitment

The international community and the SPLA reacted in a manner directly opposed to that expected by the Nasir faction The campaign s human rights abuses served to undermine the Nasir faction s charges of human rights violations committed by the SPLA under Garang Questions were repeatedly raised about the relationship between the regime in Khartoum and the leaders of the Nasir faction, including charges of military aid from the former to the latter

Internally the perception grew that the Nasir faction was a Nuer movement fighting Dinka domination rather than the Khartoum regime Further, as *Middle East International* pointed out "the savage attacks on Dinka civilians by Nuer warriors claiming to or perceived to support the Nasir [faction] have shattered popular sympathy in western Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal "[151]

The attacks greatly weakened the SPLA as a cohesive military force The ground was softened for the government s successful dry season offensive in 1992

The assault on Bor and Kongor districts by the forces of the SPLA-Nasir Anyanya 2 and the White Army unleashed a series of attacks and counter-attacks by both SPLA factions The fighting between these two groups has largely been confined to eastern Bahr al-Ghazal and western Upper Nile especially the area dubbed the "starvation triangle" between Ayod, Waat, and Kongor in Jonglei region This area had been largely free from conflict for years

The two factions encouraged civilian militias to enter the fray Nuer from northern Upper Nile participated as White Army forces, Nuer civilians from the Dinka-Nuer border areas between western Upper Nile and Eastern Bahr al-Ghazal began raiding Dinka cattle camps and villages and the SPLA-Mainstream for a time were able to use the Murle militia from eastern Upper Nile to raid Akobo and Waat areas [152]

Civilians thus entered into the conflict as armed participants and the two factions have targeted civilian populations especially in the Triangle area *Newsweek* reported that 'each side has targeted the others civilian supporters driving nearly all of the region s 450 000 people from their homes "[133] *The Independent* pointed out that there was always small-scale cattle raiding in this area but this had been replaced by "total war" with Kalashnikovs and rocket-launchers [134]

Regardless of intent civilians have been the primary victims of persistent ferocious and indiscriminate attacks by both factions in the intra-SPLA conflict Ethnic tensions have been heightened between the Dinka and Nuer because of actions by both factions leadership A journalist claims to have seen the following message written on a blackboard in the Triangle area "1993 is the year for the Dinka and Nuer to fight to elimination "[135]

An uneasy truce emerged in 1994-1995 between the two factions, punctuated by occasional skirmishes A local peace process on multiple levels was initiated, but was eventually undercut by the factions leaders

By late 1995 the Nasir (now called South Sudan Independence Army, or SSIA) faction was in complete disarray and was collapsing as a politico-military unit Fighting has occurred between different factions within the SSIA notably between those who support reuniting with the SPLA and those who want equal partner status Before his death in early 1996, William Nyoun led the former group, and Riek Machar the latter Skirmishes have taken place at Akobo, Waat, Ayod and Fangak Nyoun — and now his successor John Luk — has been supported by the SPLA, while Machar is continuing to be tainted by allegations of support from Khartoum,[136] although he is clearly interested in cutting all associations with the NIF and soliciting Ethiopian government patronage

Southern political dynamics remain fluid The SPLA is the dominant rebel movement in the south (and by far the most potent opposition in the country to the regime in Khartoum), currently in alliance with the northern National Democratic Alliance and pressing its effort to take Juba Reports of the death of the splinter SSIA are premature, though One autonomous SSIA unit headed by Stephen Duol Chuol is based in and backed by Ethiopia Units nominally loyal to Riek Machar were able to kill William Nyoun and to retake Ayod in eastern Upper Nile In Western Upper Nile, another autonomous Nuer commander, Paulino Mathiep remains in command The Nuer belt, representing the second largest ethnic group after the Dinka will likely remain outside of SPLA jurisdiction and under the loose control of a handful of Nuer commanders who rely on fomenting splits between different Nuer sections throughout Upper Nile

Nevertheless the Nuer represent one third to one fourth of the territory and manpower of the south Their successful reincorporation into the southern rebel movement is necessary for battlefield success, itself a prerequisite for movement at the negotiating table Riek Machar still has a substantial following in Nuer areas and is an important key in keeping the Nuer in the broader southern movement

Warlordism continues Strong commanders in the Jonglei area and other areas of southern Sudan have developed local fiefdoms, and are subject to little direct control by SPLA or SSIA leadership Major abuses by armed factions continue at the intercommunal level, in addition to abuses as components of larger civil war strategies by warring parties

b)   Rift Valley Province in Kenya

State-sanctioned ethnic cleansing has occurred with distressing regularity in the Rift Valley region of central Kenya since multi-partyism was announced   Kalenjin and sometimes Masai militias have attacked Kikuyu Luo and Luhya farms burning the homes and driving the residents away   Some retaliatory attacks have been organized but are apparently more opportunistic than political [137]   Beginning in February 1992 the government according to Makau wa Mutua

> orchestrated and engineered the worst intercommunal violence in the nation s history   The killings of Kikuyus and Luos within the Rift Valley   Kenya s breadbasket   by members of the Kalenjin community   from which Moi comes   were ostensibly spurred by land disputes   In reality the government used its agents and material to spark the killings to punish the opposition and drive it from the province [138]

In 1993 some 1 500 people were killed and over 300 000 displaced in clashes in the Rift Valley and Western Provinces   In 1994 the Burnt Forest and Molo areas were both subject to a series of attacks displacing up to 30 000 people   In 1995 the number of attacks have decreased but most internally displaced persons have not been able to return to their homes [139]

Land tenure is the basis for manipulating ethnic tensions in the Rift Valley   Rather than addressing growing population density and shrinking land availability the government has exploited ethnic relations in a classic divide-and-rule tactic   Asset transfer in the Rift Valley has enabled the government to reward and empower Kalenjin and Masai loyalists with gifts of land or facilitated purchase of land from sellers under duress   The losers in the process are a key constituency for the opposition in the most important agricultural area of the country

There are numerous reasons for the clashes

■   The regime wanted to portray the anarchic results of democratization

■   The regime hoped the clashes would unify the coalition between the Kalenjin and other smaller groups while displacing Kikuyu from the Rift Valley

■   The policy of *majimboism* (regionalism) was supported in an effort to restore land primarily to Kalenjin who claim they were originally displaced by the colonial authority s favoritism toward the Kikuyu [140]

Land-grabbing opportunities further fueled the clashes as politicians such as William Ntimama used ethnicity to sustain and justify the asset transfer   "[Kikuvus] had suppressed the Masai, taken their land and degraded their environment   We had to say enough is enough   I had to lead the Masai in protecting our rights "[141]

The clashes created further fragmentation along ethnic lines   It brought the historic problem of the Kikuyu back to the center of the political debate capitalizing on resentment of the Kikuyus favored status under the British and their continuing asset accumulation since then [142]

Politically the strategy was extremely successful for Moi s government and its patchwork of minority supporting groups Leaders of government-allied groups gleefully stoked the anti-Kikuyu flames and the opposition splintered throughout 1992 prior to the elections The clashes appeared to many observers as locally originating intercommunal violence rather than state-sponsored terrorism and asset-stripping [143]

The policy of dividing Masai land into individually owned ranches or farms instigated under colonialism and perpetuated to this day is another major economic conflict instigator Some academics predict that this policy will impoverish the vast majority of Masai through continuing privatization It has caused intense competition over resources that will accelerate and will likely increase social tension and undermine community tradition and culture [144]

c)   Region Four (Oromia), Ethiopia

The Oromo is one of the largest wide-ranging, and religiously, politically, and economically differentiated groups in the Greater Horn The Oromo form the largest population in Ethiopia, and Region Four is the largest administrative unit in present-day Ethiopia

Ethiopia's economic development under Haile Selassie was largely due to coffee production in peripheral areas occupied by the Oromo people Coffee production took place under landlord-tenant agreements, with Amhara or Tigrayan landlords and Oromo tenants [145]

Region Four is a classic candidate for conflict prevention The region experienced major conflict in 1992 and low-intensity conflict since then, and there are numerous fault lines which threaten stability in the region Violence in Region Four includes

- Military confrontation between the OLF and EPRDF

- OLF acts of violence

- EPRDF shakedowns of the communities in which the violence has occurred

- Intercommunal battles between the Oromo and Somali and Oromo and Amhara — historical tensions between Oromo and Amhara populations originated with a steady migration of Amhara southward from arid regions in the north [146]

- Occasional actions by the IFLO

- Small-scale resistance against the misuse of power by local OPDO officials, who themselves are guilty of violence in some locales

The future of the region is clouded by the uncertainty over the extent the NIF regime in Sudan will use IFLO or OLF to carry out a destabilization agenda

Private newspapers published in Addis and Amnesty International's *Action Alerts* are full of reports of human rights abuses by OLF, OPDO and central government soldiers These reports are strongly disputed

by other observers   The extent of abuses is not known as no comprehensive independent assessment has taken place in the Region

♦ Conflict in Oromia

When the OLF was formed in 1975 it sought to capitalize on the resentment Oromo populations felt seeing northern highlanders expropriate large areas of Oromo land and turn Oromo peasants into tenant farmers during the previous century   But the same year the Derg passed a land reform which returned the use of land to the peasants thus undercutting OLF s agenda   The appeal of OLF s call for the creation of a separate state has further been weakened by the level of Oromo assimilation in urban areas

In the mid-1980s the TPLF supported the OLF in areas where Tigrayan peasants had been forcibly resettled   The OLF for its part provided assistance to Tigrayans who were forcibly resettled in and around Asosa   After 1986 the TPLF had increasing problems with the OLF's pursuit of an independent Oromia In 1989 the TPLF founded the Oromo People s Democratic Organization (OPDO) as a rival to the OLF [147]   By the time of the transition and especially before the first round of elections in 1992 there was a steady stream of armed skirmishes between OLF and TPLF/EPRDF forces   These incidents increased tensions surrounding the post-Derg political liberalization process

The EPRDF and OLF negotiated agreements in August 1991 that gave the EPRDF control of the main towns roads and economic installations   The OLF was to withdraw to rural areas   At the same time the Council of Representatives including OLF representatives voted to make the EPRDF army the national army for the transitional period   The August agreement did not hold and conflict broke out among the OLF other Oromo Somali and Afar groups and the EPRDF [148]

The EPRDF and OLF reached a second set of agreements in late 1991 and early 1992 under EPLF mediation   Both forces agreed to encampment prior to holding regional elections   These agreements also did not stick   Fighting and talking continued consuming much of the governments' diplomatic energies

On June 20 1992 elections took place in most parts of the country   Before the election the OLF announced it would boycott   It seemed that the OLF s withdrawal might lead to civil war but this did not occur because the OLF military was unprepared and because of new rounds of negotiations initiated by a group of Western ambassadors   In the wake of the negotiations the government convened a Commission of Inquiry into electoral malpractices   This commission was intended to be a way to bring the OLF back into the government [149]

In 1991 the OLF decided to cooperate in the Transitional Government and the Council of Representatives on the basis of the Transitional Charter of 1991   However relations between EPRDF and OLF were problematic from the start   The OLF mistook EPRDF-led government reforms for regional autonomy to mean an openness to declaring Oromo independence from Ethiopia   Instead regional autonomy was intended to unify Ethiopia [150]

Tensions rose in Oromo areas during 1991-1992 with armed conflict between the EPRDF and the greatly expanded OLF   OLF was able to attract new recruits in heavily populated Oromo areas and incorporated Oromos who were former soldiers in Mengistu's army [151]

When the EPRDF instituted ethnic federalism ethnicity returned front and center to the political stage [152] The OLF found new life and entered the political process in 1991 tactically abandoning its immediate demand for independence in favor of a chance to participate in the power-sharing transition

The OLF s difficulties include

- Weak organization

- Internal schisms over leadership

- No steady source of external support

- A lack of homogeneity among Oromo populations who are divided by religion and region

The OLF from the outset of the post-Derg transition sought a power-sharing agreement with the TPLF rather than free participation in a democratic process "The intransigence of the TPLF and that of the OLF " concludes Ottaway, "created a very undemocratic vicious circle "[153]

In 1992, OPDO cadres in leading administration positions controlled the election process and gave OLF little chance to register their candidates or to campaign The OLF withdrew from the election and then was told to leave all government and Council positions

The All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) the Ethiopian Democratic Action Group (EDAG) the Gideo People's Democratic Organization (GPDO), and the OLF all named the failed functioning of proper electoral institutions and procedures as their reasons for withdrawing from the election The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) had withdrawn earlier [154]

The elections went ahead as scheduled on June 21, 1992, even though the OLF decamped and broke into smaller units which led to the resumption of civil war The insurrection was finally brought under control in early 1993, even though popular discontent persisted [155]

During the May 1995 election the Donor Election Unit encountered numerous incidents of OPDO harassment and intimidation of candidates and their supporters The level of freedom for non-OPDO candidates varied from zone to zone [156]

The threat of escalation remains, especially given the low status the OPDO is accorded by local communities due to its appearance of subservience to the EPRDF *Africa Confidential* reports that the OLF continues to be a long-term threat to Region Four s stability because "some community leaders have apparently been ill-treated over taxation and security [issues] "[157]

"The OLF is doing lots to support the OPDO by accident," observes one long-time analyst by killing prominent representatives of the OPDO and "chopping them into pieces and showing them in the market in the Wollega area " Allegations of human rights abuses are frequent, independent confirmation is elusive Some Oromo and outside analysts believe the OLF is gaining support as Oromo constituencies become increasingly disenchanted with the OPDO Others say that the longer the OLF offers no credible challenge or alternative to the government, the more their position deteriorates relative to the OPDO

The government effectively shut down the Oromo Relief Association formally associated with the OLF until 1991 by removing permission to work in the areas in which it was operating

The OLF and IFLO serve as the two militant Oromo political groups   The OLF itself is split according to de Waal between the Oromos from Harerghe (east) who are in favor of independence and the Oromo from Wollega (west) who favor a degree of autonomy within Ethiopia   The OLF has been unable to move beyond nationalist politics towards a deeper understanding and articulation of the Oromo peasantry s needs [1][8]

In the near term more than armed opposition from IFLO or OLF (barring a major intervention from the Sudanese regime) perhaps the greatest threat to security in Region Four is that of armed banditry   Tens of thousands of ex-Derg soldiers inhabit Region Four and the economy cannot expand fast enough to accommodate them

d)   Refugee Resettlement in Prefectures in Rwanda

Major flashpoints exist throughout Rwanda in areas which expect major repatriation from refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania   In some *prefectures*, population figures are roughly half of pre-genocide levels while others are nearly 100 percent   UNHCR estimates that half of all Rwandan refugees come from Kibungo Byumba, and Gisenyi prefectures

- In Ruhengeri prefecture population estimates are currently almost 100 percent of pre-genocide levels   Yet some 165 000 refugees originally from Ruhengeri have not returned   Their homesteads have largely been taken over by "old caseload" Tutsi returnees who repatriated in the year after the RPA s military victory

- Kibungo prefecture provides a similar dilemma   The Rwandan government has designated Kibungo as a permanent resettlement area for "old caseload" Tutsi returnees   Tutsis are settling there despite the presence of over 340 000 Hutus in refugee camps awaiting repatriation back to Kibungo   Major confrontations are inevitable [159]

Overall there are 750 000 "old caseload" Tutsi returnees, split evenly between rural and urban destinations   Only 20 percent of this population has resettled on their own land   The rest perhaps a half million remain internally displaced   Designated resettlement priority areas are Kibungo in the southeast the extreme northeast including parts of Akagera Park, and northwest areas between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri   Major disagreements between UNHCR and the Rwandan government continue to plague the operation [160]

After the RPF s victory and subsequent appeals for "old caseload" refugees to return home, roughly 750 000 Tutsis came back to Rwanda creating tremendous security problems   Returnees from Burundi are a key group in this return and are consolidating control over assets and marketing channels   Reyntjens observes

> The radical stance of the "Burundais" [returnees from Burundi] is a extremely disquieting phenomenon   Very many of the Burundais have chosen to settle in the towns especially in Kigali, where they exert considerable influence on the emergent political landscape [Their ideology is] extremely ethnically based and deeply vengeful, [and] adds to the danger of the break up of the RPF [161]

Human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya alleges that some Hutu refugees are prevented from returning to eastern Rwanda

> The Tutsi refugees who have returned from neighboring countries chase them out kill them and openly force them back to the borders of Rwanda with Burundi or Tanzania They claim to justify it by noting "These Hutu will return to Rwanda only after they have passed as long outside the country as the Tutsi [162]

Resettling the internally displaced has already proved fatal in some cases The worst case is the massacre at Kibeho in April 1995, in which 4 000 to 8 000 people were killed There is high potential for future confrontation when a displaced (internally or refugee) community s wishes — or more importantly its leadership structure — are at variance with the government s

Property disputes are important conflict-producing issues and these will intensify as more refugees return Those who have been in exile longer than a decade do not have rights to their former land, but those gone for less than ten years do Continuous disputes erupt between "old caseload" and "new caseload" returnees If a large-scale *refoulement* occurs from Zaire, major conflict will likely erupt

e)   Juba Valley in Somalia[163]

Some of the central conflicts fueling Somalia's continuing war are rooted in the Juba Valley [164]

♦   *Players and Issues*

Seven major sub-clan groupings are active in the ongoing Juba Valley conflict

- ■ *The Harti* This primarily urban-professional Darod sub-clan includes the Majerteen They have a militia in Kismayu but little civilian presence outside the town The Harti are aligned with Ali Mahdi Mohammed through General Hersi Morgan

- ■ *The Marehan* Before the war, Marehan officers and some civilians lived in Kismayu but never in large numbers Since the war started and Aidid and his allies were pushed out more Marehan have moved into Kismayu Many are armed They also have a militia and control many of the town s key posts Marehan leaders feel it critical to retain unimpeded access to Kismayu and conduct their military and diplomatic affairs accordingly Gedo Region is their stronghold and Kismayu is critical also as a commercial outlet for Gedo produce

- ■ *The Awlihan Ogadeni* are led by, but not wholly loyal to former Defense Minister Gebio who split with the Mohammed Zubeir Ogadeni in a struggle for control over the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

- ■ *The Mohammed Zubeir Ogadeni* Col Omer Jess leads this largest Ogadeni sub-clan Those aligned with Jess thought an alliance with Aidid could crush the Marehan and Majerteen and return the Mohammed Zubeir to Kismayu Jess is now Aidid's "Defense Minister "

- *The Dir and Biyamaal* A group of Dir and Biyamaal from Jamaame district up to Merca led by Abdi Warsame formed the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) The SSNM unlike Aidid wanted UNOSOM forces to remain in Somalia and thus broke the original alliance with the SNA to join the anti-SNA umbrella which includes Ali Mahdi and Morgan

- *The Hawiye* The numerous Hawiye sub-clans in the Valley include the Galgaal Hawaadle Sheikhal and Habr Gedir Some young men have allied with the main Hawiye factions whose militia have moved onto parts of the east bank of the Juba River while others have engaged in 'non-aligned' banditry creating instability

- *The Gosha* are ex-slaves, predominately from Tanzania and are also known as the *Bantu* Though numerous the Gosha are militarily and politically impotent and have primarily been victims and displacees in the conflict

This regional war is rooted in four overlapping struggles

- *Political Power* — various former Barre officials feel they deserve it

- *Resources* — the best land pasture, watering points, and livestock are a much more profound source of war, the Valley s richness heightens political and clan-based enmities

- *Cities* — controlling the most important towns, especially Mogadishu and Kismayu,[165] brings substantial commercial and political benefits

- *Clans* — Barre's divide-and-rule tactics exacerbated conflicts many quite ancient, among numerous contending cultures

♦   *Juba's History*

Traditionally Marehan camel herders migrated from Gedo down to Lower Juba for water and grazing during the arid dry seasons They came with the consent of the clan leaders along the river, sedentary agriculturalists who negotiated grazing rights and water-sharing agreements By the mid-1980s, some of these nomads began to come with arms rather than consent and negotiated access The Marehan manipulated the land tenure laws (which abrogated group and individual ownership and expropriated all land to the state) to control some of the best land

The state also changed labor laws to benefit the new class of landlords who were primarily interested in exploiting natural resources and gaining control of Kismayu All traditional Juba Valley systems and agreements came under siege Parallels can be made with the Shabelle Valley by 1990 urban-based absentee landlords outnumbered small producers Land prices escalated, and the state expropriated much of the best land along the Shabelle for its supporters, stripping small farmers of land their families had tilled for generations [166]

Small-scale battles checkered the Valley landscape by 1987 often pitting Marehan gunmen against Ogadenis with sticks and rocks In that year local Ogadeni communities reacted against the Marehan/Barre

government by forming the SPM   Early on Gen Adan Abdullahi Nur ('Gebio") spent considerable time suppressing this movement though he later came to head it

In 1988 the government escalated its campaign of asset confiscation and began to plumb the region s productive potential to enrich its supporters   State strategy included "loans" for agriculture fishing boats and even building tourist hotels   The Marehan were able to acquire land from the State who "owned the land especially that rented by Gosha (Bantus) from merchants   The Harti had also registered land that was actually Gosha land during the 1970s many Gosha — for instance in Jamaame District — never even knew what had happened because of their lack of participation in the political process

Historically Ogadeni and Gosha communities had agreements over grazing rights on the banks of the Juba In the 1980s though conflict between Marehan and Ogadeni pastoralists in the Juba Valley fuelled the Ogadeni rebellion in Kismayu and led to the breakdown of the Darod alliance [167]

In April 1989 Gen Gebio was sacked because of Marehan fears of Ogadeni domination of the army   The Ogadeni soldiers in Kismayu mutinied and joined the SPM headed at this point by Gen Bashir "Belihqo In June Col Omar Jess and many of his soldiers (then in Hargeisa) left the government for the SPM   By the end of 1989 Jess controlled Bakool region with the help of the Awlihan Ogadeni   When the USC SNM and SPM began coordinating their operations by August 1990, it was only a matter of time before Siad fell [168]

The defeat of Siad s forces at the end of 1990 and their abandonment of Mogadishu triggered a series of major population movements that will take years to address   When the USC swept into Mogadishu Darods began fleeing south by the thousands to Kismayu   With the Darods (Marehan and Majerteen) occupying Kismayu Jess retreated to Afmadow in the Lower Juba   In the first five months of 1991 the Juba Valley changed hands three times between the USC and the SPM/Somali National Front (the largely Marehan SNF)

In early 1991 the USC launched an offensive to capture Kismayu   They made it to Kamsuma but were repulsed by a combined Darod force   The Darod counteroffensive continued all the way to Brava coinciding with a counteroffensive by Siad Barre's troops advancing from Baidoa   A temporary Manifesto Group-Aidid alliance allowed the USC to beat back the Darod forces and the USC counter-counteroffensive in April/May 1991 knocked the Darod force backwards until they were dislodged from Kismayu   This caused another Darod exodus this time towards Doble near the Kenyan border

Jess did not participate in Kismayu s defense because of his hatred of the Darod commanders (especially Morgan) and fear of a return by Siad   Later though the Ogadeni elders used the promise of an election after retaking Kismayu to convince Jess to rejoin all the Darod under the SPM   Gebio became the interim chair Jess the Commander, and Morgan the police chief   This temporary alliance allowed the Darod forces to push the USC from Kismayu back to Brava in late June   The SPM recapture of the Juba Valley caused a major exodus of Gosha villagers to Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle

Jess arguably would have had the numerical advantage in his quest to chair the SPM but during the assembly Morgan led a Marehan and Harti attack on the conference in order to undermine Jess   Morgan wanted Gebio to lead the organization given Marehan and Harti perceptions that he could be an instrument in their quiet quest for power

The Gebio/Morgan alliance fought Jess in Lower Juba from late 1991 through May 1992 leading the latter to ally with Aidid Abdi Aden of Oxfam-UK says that 'mortality and malnutrition were at their peak in Lower Juba It was one big graveyard "[169] This period encompassed the major civil war in Mogadishu and Aidid and Jess s formation of the SNA The SNA attacked both the fronts of Siad s and Morgan s forces defeating and chasing both to Kenya and recapturing Kismayu on 15 May 1992 and Bardera by mid-year

Kismayu s Ogadeni elders were unhappy however for three main reasons

- Their communities treatment by the SNA

- The dominant role of "outsiders" such as Habr Gedir in Kismayu affairs

- The rift between Ogadeni communities (principally the Mohammed Zubeir) and other Darod sub-clans

Morgan and Gebio sought to exploit this rift and secured the help of the Kenyan military and the Marehan to launch a successful counter-attack on Bardera in September 1992 They proceeded southward into Lower Juba avoiding the principally Awlihan Ogadeni areas along the river such as Bua ale and Saco Weyne who reject Marehan control of Bardera and did not support Jess because of his alliance with Aidid They finally took Afmadow Remarkably Mohammed Zubeir Ogadeni clan elders — who also rejected Jess s leadership — raised their own army and rousted Morgan from Afmadow They reportedly planned to attack his position in Doble but the UNITAF forces arrived at the beginning of 1993 and froze the situation temporarily

After the international forces arrived the Harti and Marehan began to strategize agreeing to sacrifice everything for Kismayu controlled by Jess Before the UNITAF troops arrived, Jess s supporters executed 100 Harti civilians fearing that UNITAF would help them retake Kismayu A "Kismayu Account" was opened in Nairobi for contributions from Darod sub-clans in exile especially in Europe and North America The Hartis ensuing Trojan Horse tactics in taking Kismayu in February 1993 have been well documented After Morgan took the town on February 22, 1993 a Green Line was established to demarcate zones of control

Morgan remains an important figure in Kismayu and the surrounding area through a combination of militia power intimidation and, most importantly, agreements with key Marehan Majerteen and other sub-clan politicians and community leaders Kismayu has been destabilized by General Aidid's attempts to expand his authority during the last quarter of 1995 Aidid s "Vice-President" Mohamed Haji Adan, works inside Kismayu to divide the Majerteen and draw support away from Morgan Outside the town in the Juba Valley Aidid is working to draw important local leaders to his side

In response Morgan established a "regional administration" for Jubaland in December 1995 which exists only on paper Osman Ato remains engaged protecting his rice plantation and maneuvering in the margins of a series of complex inter-clan cleavages [170]

The Marehan have assumed control of Bardera the most important city in Gedo Region, despite its largely Rahanweyne and Ogadeni population Omer Haji is the most influential political figure in town This

reflects the culmination of a power play which began during Siad Barre s reign during which the Marehan began a State-sanctioned and -supported push to control Bardera and thus the entire Gedo Region

III   Sources of Conflict in the Greater Horn: A Thematic Treatment

It is nearly impossible to isolate individual causes of conflict and specific causality chains for each conflict context when analyzing the Greater Horn of Africa   This is true both at the analytical stage or when determining appropriate policy responses [171]

- The causes of armed conflict are numerous and interconnected ranging from individual or group volition to structural inequality and injustice

- Causes are both local and the result of transformations of the international structure since the end of the Cold War

The most appropriate conceptual framework for Greater Horn war might be the kaleidoscope in which shifting combinations of various elements produce particular effects

Although the quality of governance in a few states in the Greater Horn has improved in the last decade most state structures are steadily eroding   Continuing economic decline and material insecurity are accompanied in many countries in the region by increasing political instability and conflict

- The geopolitical map is being rearranged in the Horn as new states are formed — Eritrea has won independence Somaliland has declared it and southern Sudanese rebels seek it

- Power is being redistributed — group power relationships are far from stable in most states in the Greater Horn

This process may be required to overcome the legacy of imperialism   Other African regions may follow the Horn s lead [172]

Groups involved in conflict often perceive their struggle as one of survival   This holds no matter what the organizing rationale for group identity — religion ethnicity political affiliation economic interest, etc   The result is a process with little hope of compromise and little attention to human rights   Only from this perspective do the terrible events occurring make any sense [17]

This section will examine a number of causes of conflict in the Greater Horn, all of which contribute to the kaleidoscope of instability in the region   They will reflect a division between

- **Systemic conditions** which involve basic factors that are change slowly if at all, and would include

  - Extra-regional factors such as the legacies of colonialism and the Cold War and the breakdown of values and traditions

  - Intra-regional factors such as geophysical conditions, resource scarcity poverty, socio-economic inequalities and ethnic divisions

- **Conflict enabling conditions** which involve proximate factors relatively more changeable in the short run including

    - Extra-regional factors such as imposed economic reform arms flows and military aid

    - Intra-regional factors such as the components of classic weak states including militarization competition for state power war-making for economic gain and the strains of political liberalization and ideological differences

A.   Systemic Conditions

1   Extra-Regional Factors

a)   The Colonial and Cold War Legacies

Colonialism in the Greater Horn has tremendous cultural ramifications   Kenya s Wangari Maathai summarizes the interrelated impacts of the colonial period

> Culture is Africans antennae into the unknown future and their reference point into the past   People who are robbed of their heritage during occupation enslavement and political and religious colonization, become disoriented and disempowered

> The world cannot ignore centuries of cultural adulteration of the African people through religious and mental indoctrination against their heritage

> Colonization has left Africans weakened culturally, economically and politically , [and in] a crisis of leadership [174]

These cultural effects cannot be overemphasized   Nigeria s Adigun Agbaje contends that colonialism s attempt to replace indigenous values with Western ones produced a cultural dualism, leading to a "moral disorientation among the African people between the old and the new a dualism neither well-aligned nor properly digested " Communalism and traditional religious leadership were discouraged, replaced with "the gospel of individualism and a monastic and abstract view of a universal remote God not directly concerned with issues of governance, who could be approached only through practices and observances infused with Western cultural precepts "[175]

One of the most important legacies of the colonial era was expansionism   The British pushed their boundaries in southern Sudan and Kenya until they met resistance from Ethiopia, France and Italy all of whom were expanding their rule concurrently   The trend continued after independence with Somali irredentism Ethiopia s annexation of Eritrea, claims on French-protected Djibouti and various border skirmishes   Internal expansion — within state boundaries — of state power often met with violence such as in the Ogaden Bale and Sidamo provinces of Ethiopia during Emperor Selassie's reign [176]

Expansionism incorporated resistant groups who discovered that mobilizing around ethnic or religious solidarity was often the most effective way to fight for political change   These fault lines of identity corresponded to cleavages of economic and political opportunity, creating a potential for conflict that has

grown Centralizing power in the post-colonial state was often a response to or excuse for ethnic strife and political competition exacerbating underlying problems while temporarily overwhelming symptoms The main investment in governance in the Greater Horn was the multi-faceted instrument of internal security   subverting broader development of governance and civil society

North-south dichotomies were cemented during colonial rule Separate administration of northern and southern Sudan British Somalia and Italian Somaliland and Italian Eritrea and uncolonized Ethiopia and regional or ethnic favoritism in Uganda Kenya Rwanda and Burundi helped lead to political disputes directly after the departure of the colonial administrations

Some analysts argue that current conflicts result from colonialism and "incomplete nation-building During colonization heterogeneous populations were united into single parties and movements against the common enemy Some states still experience conflict between those who won and those who lost out at independence

Colonial borders are also a source of conflict Due to the Cold War these conflicts were not easily distinguishable as internal or inter-state wars The end of the Cold War has weakened ideologies and internal security mechanisms resulting in new demands for self-determination [178]

Cold War imperatives influenced the policies of external actors toward the region dictating support to military regimes to contain expansionist tendencies of the contending blocs Although states and their associated social welfare systems received resources this support included hundreds of millions of dollars of military assistance reinforcing repressive security apparati and legitimizing divide-and-rule governing policies

The northeast corner of the Greater Horn was a particular target because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf the importance of the Red Sea for oil transit and its strategic military importance for potential naval blockades The Soviet Union poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Somalia before — and billions into Ethiopia after — 1977 The United States did the reverse although on a lesser scale The US also supported a wider collection of governments beyond Ethiopia and Somalia including Sudan under Numeiry and Kenya

When the Cold War ended and military aid ceased authoritarian states either met violent ends or mutated to attempt to address the post-colonial interests of donor states especially democratization Nevertheless the legacy of overdeveloped internal security systems and militaries remain fixtures in most Greater Horn states even in countries where governments are attempting to make clean breaks with the past As is seen in Russia and some of the former Soviet Republics rapid change is not easy

b)   The Breakdown of Values and Traditions

Rural-to-urban migration continues to escalate throughout Africa One African government minister described the effects of urbanization

> In the villages of Africa it is perfectly natural to feed at any table and lodge in any hut But in the cities this communal existence no longer holds You must pay for lodging and be invited for food

> When young men find out that their relations cannot put them up thev become lost Thev join other migrants and slip graduallv into the criminal process [179]

The cultural crisis which results from urbanization is further explored bv Zaire s Zeke Gbotokuma

> Among the most painful consequences of this exodus are depersonalization and deculturalization Despite their limited attractions the way of living in the villages still procured a certain reassurance and a feeling of solidaritv There were laws order mutual community help and in the family along with a sense of responsibilitv for the needs of the others was the feeling that someone cares about me takes care of me " This sense of responsibilitv is lost in the big cities In the traditional milieu the individual has a clearlv defined status and a corresponding role to play in the urban slums he is isolated nobody cares about him and he does not feel responsible for anybodv It is everv man for himself, families must face competition from other families a task for which thev are ill-prepared In the city, the immigrant must abandon his system of values his traditional behavior, from then on unemplovment crime alcoholism debauchery divorce, etc become commonplace Respect for one s elders and parental authority diminish or disappear [180]

On the other hand women often migrate to the city to avoid degrading traditional practices and to pursue economic opportunities unavailable in the country Nevertheless, what is gained in freedom from tradition is eroded bv increased physical danger without the protection of kinship networks

Participants in a workshop for local Sudanese NGOs were asked to consider which traditional values were no longer respected and why The major responses for the reasons why traditional values have changed include

■ Modern weaponry allowing for indiscriminate killing

■ Traditional values no longer passed along

■ The absence of a legal system outside the military in which criminals can be brought to justice

■ The replacement of traditional authority by military authority increasing the likelihood of using force to resolve disputes

■ Economic stresses including the rise of female-headed households and military lifestyles

■ The sheer brutalization of society in times of prolonged war [181]

Problems in promoting peace, protecting human rights and delivering humanitarian assistance are related to the weakening of traditional authority structures which occur for a varietv of reasons These reasons include

■ Marginalization by political movements and relief agencies

■ Disrupted transmission of traditional values because of displacement

■ The brutalization of society when prolonged war creates a thirst for revenge and a generation knowing only violence

■   The growth of an entrepreneurial class which depends on the economic benefits of war and does not hesitate to incite violence

■   Growing impoverishment and dwindling resources which make it difficult to manifest the traditional value of caring for the most vulnerable [18]

Constitutional law has replaced customary law in many places However national governments have often been unable to manage local disputes without using repressive measures In the colonial and immediate post-colonial period the customary role of elders as peacemakers became subject to party ideology and political manipulation and lost legitimacy

Absent traditional means for resolving disputes the transfer of assets from the politically weak to the strong was accelerated by modern weaponry In some cases the use of modern weapons helped destroy the remnants of balanced reciprocity Local conflicts escalated into state conflicts over the semi-subsistence economy sometimes resulting in famine and increased vulnerability of the weak [183]

2   Intra-Regional Factors

a)   Resource Scarcity and Competition

The primary cause of conflict in the Greater Horn is competition over declining resources The central role of the state in determining resource distribution makes it a major target and when power is over-centralized reason for conflict [184]

The natural resource base topography and climate of the Greater Horn are contributing factors to conflict especially in the Northern Tier countries — Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Somalia and Sudan The history of the region includes massive population movements pushed by other groups and pulled by the search for better pasture and water sources

■   Pastoral migrations are legendary Arab populations in the Sudan migrated from Egypt Ethiopian Oromo originated in the tip of the Horn the Somali came from the Gulf of Aden

■   The Horn contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world Sudan has the highest percentage globally Somalia is third Ethiopia is fifth in Djibouti one third of the population is pastoralist [185]

Drought is cyclical and omnipresent increasingly in combination with over-cultivation Desertification of large areas of once fertile soil reduction of available land and intensification of competition over remaining land results

The Greater Horn of Africa suffers from extreme population pressures calculated both in terms of population density and growth rates

■   Some of the highest population densities in the world are found in the Southern Tier of the Horn especially Rwanda and Burundi

■ The Northern Tier also has some of the highest population growth rates globally ranging from a high of 3 5 percent in Djibouti to a *low* of 2 8 percent in Sudan

Cultivable land is limited in Ethiopia for example only a quarter of the total land mass is planted [186]

Land tenure in the region remains a critical issue a "ticking time bomb ' in one Somali aid official s words

■ Land tenure is among the issues that led to Siad Barre s overthrow and is the root of much of the fighting in Lower Shabelle and the Juba Valley as Omaar and de Waal confirm "Clan-based militias have ravaged the country, but the commonest reason for their wars is land "[187]

■ In Rwanda land tenure and property ownership are some of the most explosive issues The Arusha Accords of 1993 stipulated that refugees who return within ten years have the rights to reoccupy their homes and land Therefore,"old caseload" Tutsi refugees — originally displaced in 1959 — do not have rights to their own homesteads and they often occupy the property and land of the 1994 refugees No clear legal process and policy has yet emerged to address this issue

■ In Kenya, Burundi and Ethiopia land tenure is a critical component of conflict as well

Erosion and improper agricultural practices have greatly damaged the land's productive capacity Food production increases have fallen behind population growth This population growth combined with commercially-driven increases in the animal population has led to denudation, intensified erosion falling yields, and possibly climatic change precipitation has declined since the 1950s, drought is now common and famine inevitably follows [188]

Economic deprivation and environmental degradation escalate as poor inhabitants of degraded ecosystems are forced to compete for diminishing resources Often conflict is the result as, for example, in the conflict between pastoralist tribes over *haffirs* — water points — in Sudan [189]

The balance between people and nature is threatened as drought reduces the available resources needed by livestock Pastoralists are forced to roam in smaller areas and overgraze vegetation overexploit water sources and prevent regeneration [190]

Government action has often exacerbated conflict rather than provided relief Destructive processes are often supported by legislation In Sudan, traditional grazing lands were taken away from pastoralists and distributed to wealthy farmers for tractor cultivation on the assumption that unregistered land was empty [191]

Environmental pressures almost always causes further insecurity as people arm themselves for protection against theft of their resources The availability of weapons moves war-producing environmental causes (the Greenwar cycle) to higher levels of intensity Environmentally-caused conflict in turn produces further environmental degradation creating a vicious cycle of ecological decline competition for diminishing resources increased hostility, intercommunal fighting, and social and political breakdown In a semi-subsistence economy the easiest form of attack is to destroy the natural resources an opponent needs for survival [192]

b)   Poverty

Endemic poverty and wide inequalities of income are reliable if not immutable predictors of conflict Countries torn by violent conflict average one-third the GNP of non-warring nations 'Poverty of this magnitude notes Copson 'contributed to the emergence of war by exacerbating underlying social tensions and depriving governments of the means of ending war "[193] Combined with a legacy of state-controlled economies poverty severely limits opportunities in education employment and economic advancement Copson notes

> This lack of opportunity can intensify the sense of grievance among social groups suffering
> discrimination When opportunities generally are scarce discrimination can take away any hope of
> finding employment In tearing the last shreds of hope it causes deep resentment and destroys any
> sense among its victims that they have a stake in society In Sudan Liberia Uganda and Rwanda
> the denial of opportunity and impoverishment of people linked by primordial ties undoubtedly
> contributed to the strength of societal resistance to the state [194]

Food insecurity is inextricably linked with poverty as a root causal factor for violence When combined with deep social and economic inequalities the struggle for scarce resources — especially food — can be a major contributor to violent conflict Young men from food-insecure regions who face limited livelihood opportunities are the pawns in the power struggles defining most conflicts in the Greater Horn

c)   The Marginalization of Pastoralists

Most borders in the Northern Tier of the Greater Horn were drawn through areas inhabited by lowland pastoralists dividing ethnic groups and pastures The Somali were carved up into five states the Afar three the Beja and Boran two Markakis notes

> The economic viability social integrity and political efficacy of pastoral society were gravely
> impaired as a result and pastoralist groups were gradually relegated to a marginal position alien and
> alienated in a changing world The decline of pastoralism and endemic conflict in the lowlands of the
> Horn are closely related phenomena [195]

Constraints on the mobility and migrations of pastoral communities over the last century have severely limited their grazing lands National and provincial borders designated grazing zones wildlife sanctuaries and transfer of land to cultivation have reduced the room to roam igniting conflicts over land and water These conflicts are reinforced by traditional rivalries among pastoral groups

Conflict has been most prevalent in areas lacking in natural resources and neglected by the state whose inhabitants are not part of the ruling group These pastoralist regions are usually so deprived that the inhabitants very existence is threatened

d)   Ethnicity

Exacerbating ethnic cleavages is a tactic leaders use to gain or consolidate power Colonial rulers — and similarly Ethiopian monarchs — and their successors have fueled ethnic tension by deliberately favoring

certain ethnic or religious groups at the expense of others This approach to governance was directly supported by Cold War aid suppliers despite rhetoric to the contrary

These divide-and-rule strategies created enduring ethnically-linked economic and political inequalities which help kindle continuing cycles of rebellion and repression Superpower military and economic aid during the post-colonial era underwrote these strategies and reinforced these divisions in countries as diverse as Djibouti Kenya and Burundi The Isaaq in Somalia the Tigravans in Ethiopia and the Dinka in Sudan are examples of ethnic groups which suffered explicit discrimination from national governments and eventually erupted into violent rebellion

In most Greater Horn conflicts the parties belong to different ethnic or clan groups Whether the conflicts are caused by ethnic differences is hotly debated that ethnicity contributes to them is undeniable

Why is ethnicity often the most effective form of political mobilization? Markakis explains

> Ethnicity is an imperative embedded in the foundations of the political order and functions as a
> controlling factor in the political process long before an ethnic movement appears to challenge that
> order It is precisely because ethnicity is intrinsically political in that setting that ruling groups go to
> great lengths to exorcise its spirit with invocations of "nation-building" and "national unity " In the
> ethnocentric state' as one would expect, ethnicity is also the ruling principle of economic and social
> differentiation This means that this principle divides along ethnic lines groups that confront each
> other in the process of competition for material and social resources
>
> The ethnic group as a political actor is a product of the situation, not of history and what mobilizes
> its members to take collective action is concern for future prospects, not an atavistic attachment to the
> past [196]

The integration of African states has usually been at the expense of distinctive identities interests and aspirations of various nationalities and peoples and is based on domination by small ruling classes belonging largely to one ethnic group [197]

Another characteristic of conflict-prone areas that is related to ethnicity is cultural repression Ruling groups discriminate against groups whose language and culture are different in the name of "national integration "[198]

A misunderstanding often occurs when conflicts in Africa are attributed strictly to "tribal warfare" and Western analysts try to place the burden of violence on sociological factors inherent to Africa This view ignores the fact that asymmetrical modernization in Africa gave ethnic groups an incentive to organize and increased the level of competition that already existed in most countries [199]

In theory, modernization should cause ethnic competition to moderate as society organizes itself around capitalist production Class cleavages should be more defining under capitalism than tribal or ethnic bonds Yet modernization often creates group competition for resources rather than causing its deterioration

Robert Bates argues that there is a "rational basis for ethnic competition" since each ethnic group actually represents politically mobilized coalitions used to attain limited income and capital [200] The most fundamental resources that groups desire are land markets, power and jobs Competition for these resources can be fierce

From colonial times groups tended to be organized along ethnic or tribal lines This meant that groups that inhabited strategic or resource-rich areas received a greater share of the benefits of modernization They also had an incentive to mobilize to gain political power to ensure that they retained these advantages Thus political power with authority over the distribution of many of the benefits of modernity became tied to ethnic mobilization

Competition for political power often exacerbates ethnic tensions Many African political leaders have mobilized supporters through ethnic appeals which can worsen tensions and may lead to outbreaks of ethnic conflict In particular poorly designed and implemented elections which are perceived to be rigged or are not seen as accurate expressions of political preferences have aggravated ethnic tensions The mobilization that began with resources desired from modernization continues

B.   Conflict-Enabling Conditions

1   Extra-Regional Factors

a)   Economic Reform Programs

The austerity measures introduced by economic stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs often intensify poverty and income inequality at least in the short run and therefore can exacerbate insecurity Introducing user fees for previously free services has heightened social tensions as has the removal of certain producer and consumer subsidies as was demonstrated in Rwanda Austerity measures have caused food riots and other forms of instability in some countries This in turn has led to the expansion of security systems designed to repress such public expression [01] undermining what are often parallel processes of democratization

b)   Ideology

Deeply held ideologies drove many liberation movements which won power in the Greater Horn The leaders of the current governments in Eritrea Ethiopia Uganda, and Rwanda all spent years in the bush after significant university experience as have some of the leaders of the southern Sudanese rebel movements These leaders have firm ideas about governance human rights justice and other central issues often different from Western donor concepts The NIF-controlled government in Sudan is also driven by a particular ideology, political Islam

Ideology was more overt before socialism s demise While socialism still drives some leaders in the Greater Horn of Africa the more salient disagreements now are over models of governance secularism versus the clerically dominated state multi-partyism versus single-partyism, federalism proportional versus representational elections strong versus weak presidency and so on

c) External Military Aid

Good governance is a Northern condition for aid but the North continues to export materials/technology that support bad governments The greatest transfer of technology North-to-South is in armaments [0] Strategically driven foreign aid and trade have valued stability over inclusion

Conflict in the Greater Horn has been fueled by external military aid to governments and rebel groups

■ France in Rwanda, Burundi and Djibouti

■ The United States in Sudan Ethiopia and then Somalia after 1977

■ The Soviet Union in Somalia and then Ethiopia in the same year

■ The British in Kenya

At the height of arms transfers during the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was providing Ethiopia $1 billion per year in arms, while the US underwrote a significant portion of the defense budgets of Sudan Somalia and Kenya Among others France East Germany Cuba Israel Iran and Libya have all been significant arms providers to combatants in the Horn during the past decade Private arms dealers have also been extremely active in the region

This military aid underwrote local and national military responses to fundamental economic and political problems delaying their resolution and intensifying their importance Prolonged military rule was the logical result

2 Intra-Regional Factors

a) The Dysfunctional State

The disconnect in the Greater Horn between social organization and the state is a major cause of conflict Originally expected to mobilize populations and economies and to modernize societies, the state at the end of the colonial period quickly became consumed with corruption and the consolidation of power Possibilities for participation gradually eroded New terms were developed to describe the deterioration of governing structures "soft state," "lame Leviathans " and "pathological patrimonialism "[203]

An important cause of Africa's deepening crisis has been political exclusion through single-party state-dominated authoritarian rule Basil Davidson referred to this hijacking by the state as "top-down commandism" which repudiated "Africa's democratic tradition" and produced "a concerted aggression against the common people "[204]

■ There are various gradations of exclusionary rule in the Greater Horn from fascist fundamentalism to narrowly based authority

■ Election processes are tightly controlled manipulated or flawed

- Coalition governments are often powerless window-dressing or tenuously balanced

- Political movements throughout the region which are opposed to governments are often no more inclusive

Even with a genuine will to share power politicians have great difficulty in developing coalitions across ethnic religious or regional blocs Groups exert intense pressure on leaders to consolidate power when other groups pose a serious challenge Fear of eventually losing power often leads to a rapid effort to acquire resources often illicitly and extra-judiciously by the group(s) in authority

Copson contends that wars in Africa have resulted from "grave errors of policy and conduct" by regimes in power Decision-making processes offered no room for participation or expressions of dissent by affected communities Examples include President Numeiry s imposition of Shari a and redivision of the south in Sudan Emperor Haile Selassie s annexation of Eritrea President Obote s stealing of the 1980 elections in Uganda and Siad Barre s increasingly exclusionary reign in Somalia These errors of policy connected with a perception of exploitation by a certain region or ethnic group, combined to produce conflict as in Tigray southern Sudan Eritrea and the Buganda in Uganda [205]

In a recent public forum Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated that "All African countries are potentially failed states " He claimed that the two most important reasons for violence in Africa are perceptions of mistreatment by a population and no legal channel for that population to address that perceived injustice [206]

In some Horn countries — Ethiopia Eritrea Uganda and Rwanda — visionary leadership from a younger generation of ex-freedom fighters has glossed over deepening structural problems One problem is a proliferation of fissures within national opposition groups in the region both armed and unarmed The lack of open democratic structures gives a convenient excuse for opposition leaders to go underground and into the bush As opposition groups split internally violence and volatility usually increase In response state repression also increases reinforcing the cycle and delaying the opportunity to address fundamental issues

There is an extraordinary divide between the concerns of ordinary people in the Greater Horn and the machinations of the political-military elite Peter Vale of South Africa's University of the Western Cape speaks to the gulf between rulers and ruled

> In post-colonial Africa people have become totally alienated from the state States are seen as partnerships of predatory elites Part of that alienation is to withdraw [207]

A further element of dysfunctional leadership is the phenomenon of elite insecurity Brian Job describes this critical issue as

> an internal predicament in which individuals and groups acting against perceived threats to assure their own security or securities consequently create an environment of increased threat or reduced security for most if not all others within the borders of the state [208]

b)   Competition for State Power

Profound demographic shifts are underway in the Greater Horn stemming from contests over state power and from the transfer of assets and resources that results from changes in government There are numerous current examples

- Fundamentalists backed by the Sudanese government have gained control of much of the productive infrastructure and marketing channels in northern Sudan and are penetrating into central and southern parts of the country, pursuing policies of ethnic cleansing in some areas with great economic potential such as the Nuba Mountains and Northern Bahr al-Ghazal

- Rwandans who were "old-case" refugees in Burundi and Uganda began reasserting themselves in Rwanda and consolidating assets and political power within a year after returning in the wake of the genocide

- Habr Gedir pastoralist militias originally from Central Somalia have forcibly occupied key productive zones in Lower Shabelle and Bay Regions as well as commercial channels in the capital of Mogadishu

- Historic jockeying for ascendancy in Ethiopia continues as politically paramount groups move south and experiment with ethnic federalism, creating regional power struggles which presently take precedence over national ones

- Leaders of various communities position themselves for the spoils of Kenya's eventual transition displacing and stripping the assets of certain Rift Valley communities

- The Issa/Habr Awol are consolidating their commercial axis from the Ogaden through Somaliland displacing formerly paramount Darod/Ogadenis and Issaq/Garhajis

These historical realignments of populations and political power are fueled by a hyper-exploitative quest for the consolidation of resources and access to the machinery of the state — taxation, trade patronage and aid

In post-colonial Africa and especially in the Greater Horn, the state is often the locus of conflict because it controls "the production and distribution of material and social resources "[209] Unequal access to state power inevitably creates conflict, as those in power attempt to consolidate it and those outside fight to get in As Markakis concludes, "[State power] is the real bone of contention and the root cause of the conflict in the Horn, whether it is fought in the name of the nation region religion ethnicity or clanship "[210]

The socialization of the economy means that the state provides the main channel for the accumulation of personal wealth and privilege [211] The state's role as a vehicle to accumulate personal wealth causes a brutal competition for power and position where groups and individuals feel that they must win at any cost to society or individual life [212]

The state may promote conflict by investment decisions, such as choosing certain export sectors, especially agriculture and livestock These sectors, by no coincidence are usually controlled by ruling elites Resulting investment patterns lead to extraordinary disparities in economic opportunity from region to region These disparities intensify when the state provides social services disproportionately to the same

areas This trend worsens inequalities between various social groups and regions resulting tensions feed civil conflicts The most conflicted areas in the Greater Horn are nearly all areas which have been excluded from the fruits of state investment

Governments in the Greater Horn have also aggravated differences through cultural imperialism imposing their language religion and particular versions of history on all groups Markakis demonstrates the folly of such policies

> Forced assimilation not only was rejected by subordinate groups but also encouraged them to invoke their own cultural symbols most often religion and language in the propagation of what may be called dissident nationalism   As a result the conflict often appears to be a sectarian or communal struggle lacking objective causes
>
> However appearances can be misleading On the one hand cultural elements are often used as rallying symbols to mobilize groups in conflict that have an objective material basis   On the other hand cultural elements themselves can have a material dimension in a given situation [214]

c)   War for Economic Gain (Crass Profiteering)

Understanding the causes and consequences of war means that one must examine war s relationship to political and economic processes War would not occur or persist if it did not have significant functions benefits for political power groups [215]

The absence of ideology is striking in Greater Horn conflicts "The combatants are often crass profiteers motivated by pure self-interest " says one observer Participants are motivated by profits and plunder They use ethnicity and fear to mobilize and terrorize Asset-stripping is a primary feature of this profiteerism which has become easier with the advent of modern weaponry

Since they can profit authorities can gain more from war than from peace As civilian economies contract or collapse asset-stripping and controlling aid become attractive options when compared to slow painstaking democracy-building with no survival guarantees In extreme cases famine or scarcity can be profitable in times of stress assets are transferred from poor to rich rapidly and at panic prices

Insecurity and conflict are manipulated for economic gain in the following ways

- Raiding

- Protection rackets

- Diversion of relief

- Charging people to move from one area to another

- Official corruption and the use of public funds for private purposes

- The use of force to skew markets in particular ways

   a)   Ejecting people from productive or mineral-rich land [16]

The benefits of war can exceed its costs for groups or individuals who are relatively immune to these costs Benefits may be intended or unintended benefits may accrue to a narrow or to a large section of the population

- Keen hypothesizes that unintended benefits that accrue to a broad section of the population may perpetuate the conflict but probably do not cause it

- Intended benefits that accrue to a narrow section of the population are likely to be a cause of war These intended benefits can be described as part of the function of war and must be taken into account in any attempt to prevent reduce or stop a war [217]

Those benefitting from violence may find it relatively easy to avoid the costs of fighting This may help to explain patterns and persistence of conflict [218] Large sections of the population may benefit from security in areas controlled by warlords or "mafia-type" bosses [219]

Other economic benefits can accrue from war, including

- Monopolizing trade and profits through violence and smuggling

- Exploiting labor through low wages or in extreme cases slavery

- Taking valuable land

- Controlling and manipulating emergency aid

- Gaining or retaining state power and the corollary benefits of aid and taxation [220]

Some wartime economic strategies are clearly exploitative, such as raiding and protection rackets Other strategies are not directly exploitative but are damaging to long-term production These include

- Stripping the environment

- Selling off assets

- Consuming seed

- Leaving productive land

- Investing in activities of limited usefulness rather than putting money into production "legitimate" trade or savings

- Directing public policy to attract external aid rather than develop the domestic economy

Upward mobility and opportunity are often best accessed by joining militia forces Alternative peacetime livelihoods rarely offer the same benefits and security as membership in an armed force be it government rebel or criminal

There is often a fine line between politically motivated violence and criminality Asset-stripping and attacks on those in power in many Greater Horn countries are often linked Politically motivated opportunism with economic rewards is a driving force behind violence in many places [1]

The parallel economy — the transfer of assets that can fuel war — can represent an essential source of income and is not necessarily violent However attempts at regulation usually generate violence The parallel economy is very destructive of the subsistence economy and in some places has resulted in the virtual annihilation of certain ethnic groups as occurred with the Nuba Mundari and Uduk in southern Sudan [2]

An analysis of the political economy of war in Africa explains that war is not chaotic but is usually organized to benefit the few It also identifies how international aid can be used to sustain violent conflict [3]

The functions of a civil war may be economic and political for international actors as well Governments and groups outside the country may be directly or indirectly involved in trying to secure or maintain a distribution of political and economic power to fit their own interests [4]

d)   The Difficulties of Political Liberalization

In the Greater Horn attempts to liberalize political processes such as introducing multi-party elections have been incomplete and fraught with difficulty Liberalization is risky Change is likely to cause conflict at least in the short-term

Understandably then some approaches to political liberalization in formerly authoritarian states can increase instability One study found that states transforming from autocracy to multi-party democracy are twice as likely to fight wars in the following decade than states that remain autocratic [5] Conversely other studies have demonstrated that partial multi-party systems are actually better at containing conflict by providing limited channels for expression [6] Although voters are averse to the high costs of war full multi-party democratization can by dangerous when domestic pressure produces incentives for elites to elevate nationalist sentiment [7] "Democracy challenges entrenched autocratic elites," notes one analyst for USAID "and thus can engender a violent period "[8]

Introducing a multi-party electoral process can exacerbate instability and heighten tensions in the following way according to Hizkias Assefa

> As can be seen in many Western countries (and already in Africa) having access and selling one s
> ideas in a competitive multi-party situation requires a complex organizational capability and abundant
> material and human resources Ordinary citizens are usually restricted in their ability to sell their
> ideas due to a lack of access to these means Therefore it is usually those individuals with wealth
> connections and strong organizations who can put forward their views and exercise their influence

> The most serious problem with the multi-party system has to do with its high degree of win/lose orientation in election contests one party wins and the other loses   The winner gloats in triumph while the vanquished licks its wounds   The loser must accept its loss and wait for its turn in the next round of elections to hopefully defeat the opponent   This approach works in societies characterized by a strong measure of social consensus and where the issues of contention are relatively marginal Multi party competition tends to exacerbate rifts rather than provide resolution to outstanding social and political issues   Especially when ethnicity is an important factor in party affiliation losing an election might mean exclusion from power for an entire ethnic group followed by discrimination and even repression [229]

During processes of political liberalization both new elites and old ruling groups, resort to nationalist appeals in their fight for public support   A weak state may fragment further when the strain of liberalization is placed on it especially winner-take-all approaches to democracy   Severe pressures are exerted by powerful remnants of the old order, such as the military and internal security systems are often responsible for keeping weak states together by force   Increased conflict between different interest groups (political, economic identity) can result [230]

The initiation of multi-party liberalization processes has in many cases intensified conflict in the Greater Horn

- In the Rift Valley in Kenya ethnic tensions were deliberately stoked to achieve particular political objectives including the appearance of anarchy and ethnic strife

- In Rwanda, the fear of losing power fueled the extremists plans for a "final solution "

- In Sudan, problems during the democratic period accelerated the plans of a clique of fascist fundamentalists to grab power

- In Ethiopia the governing coalition narrowed rapidly when movement towards elections took place before genuine reconciliation had taken place after the fall of the Derg

Political liberalization often comes with economic reform which can decrease the rewards authorities can dole out to various parties as the formerly closed economy opens and the state's ability to skim resources diminishes   Leaders may understandably resist these new pressures becoming desperate to hold on to their advantages   Leaders may employ tools to maintain control including fomenting violent conflict

Winner-take-all elections can marginalize minorities and provide an opportunity for disaffected losing parties to challenge the state militarily   There is increasing recognition of the importance of minimizing the win-lose orientation of electoral politics

In analyzing the effects of introducing electoral processes numerous issues arise including appropriate electoral laws, electoral processes types of electoral systems etc   These questions must be addressed in terms of whether they will increase polarization of the system   There is a rich debate about how institutions and electoral laws can be structured so as not to inflame ethnic cleavages and tensions

But election laws are only part of the democratization equation   Basic laws related to freedom of expression and association are critical as well   If groups are prevented from forming political parties and setting forth their views effectively, there are incentives to disrupt the system whether by peaceful boycott

or violent revolt More broadly when there are widespread perceptions that the state is infringing on basic rights and there are no legal procedures for redress violent responses often occur

How deep the liberalization process goes is also key in averting violence When components of government outside the executive — parliaments courts etc — are perceived as powerless there are less opportunities to channel broad societal currents and to bring about significant compromise A party may lose the presidency but if that party s members feel they can have retain autonomy and control over their own lives through empowered local government structures they may not resort to violence The solution is not authoritarianism but rather deeper political liberalization

Formal democratic institutions in the Greater Horn are extremely weak particularly political parties They often cannot serve as an effective vehicle for those who want their views expressed In most instances there has been little grassroots organizing These institutions have little impact on national level decisions in most Greater Horn countries

Consequently individuals who want to express themselves increasingly turn to civil society organizations or to violence The development of civil organizations will be key to avoiding future conflict if these organizations act in ways that bring groups together rather then aggravating societal cleavages

e)   Militarization

Organized primitive weaponry can be devastating as seen in Rwanda However civilian casualties have increased with the proliferation of modern arms land mines counter-insurgency operations and low-intensity warfare tactics It is estimated that 90 percent of deaths in civil conflicts are civilian [31]

Access to arms is becoming easier and cheaper in most of the Greater Horn High-technology weaponry new modalities of war and intensified cycles of revenge have overwhelmed traditions that formerly attempted to ensure that elders agreed on what wars were to be fought and that maintained a code of chivalry in battle [32]

Militarization consumes enormous resources Mengistu Haile Mariam spent over $700 million per year for military purposes and Sudan continues to spend over $1 million per day to finance its war in the south [33]

IV.   About the Team

◆   *Author*

The analysis in this document was performed by John Prendergast consultant to Creative Associates International Inc since October 1995 Mr Prendergast is a specialist on issues related to the Greater Horn of Africa He brings particular expertise in humanitarian aid human rights and conflict management He is currently the Director of the Horn of Africa Project at the Center of Concern He has worked with a variety of relief and development NGOs UN and government agencies as well as human rights organizations in Africa Europe and the United States

Mr Prendergast has authored numerous articles in magazines newspapers and journals He authored or co-authored the following books

■   *Without Troops and Tanks Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea* Trenton Red Sea Press 1994 (with Mark Duffield)

■   *Civilian Devastation Human Rights Abuses by all Parties in Sudan* New York Human Rights Watch 1994 (with Jemera Rone)

■   *Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Sudan* Khartoum UNICEF 1995

■   *Humanitarian Aid and Conflict Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa* Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishing (tentative)

■   *Humanitarian Band-Aids for Human Rights Crises Somalia and Sudan Case Studies*, London Pluto Press forthcoming, 1996

■   *Crisis and Hope in Africa*, Belgium CIDSE Consortium forthcoming, 1996

◆   **Editing Team**

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◆   **Creative Associates International, Inc.**

Creative Associates International Inc (CAII), incorporated in 1979, is a private minority and women-owned and operated professional and technical services firm CAII is headquartered in Washington, DC with branch offices and project staff in Africa Latin America and the Middle East

CAII has provided technical assistance to a range of institutions from grassroots organizations to cabinet and ministry-level governmental departments CAII has designed managed and evaluated a wide range of projects and research activities from leadership development to community development CAII staff have procured commodities to support other development initiatives CAII s philosophy is culturally and professionally appropriate to provide expertise in a cost-efficient manner to achieve the client s goals

CAII has a longstanding history of collaborative and sensitive work in Africa CAII has conducted various projects for the Africa Bureau of USAID (Women in Development in Africa) Examples of CAII work in the Greater Horn region include the Somalia Management Training and Development Project a strategy for training and the Education Reform Project in Rwanda and national-level interventions for primary education in Uganda

V. Acronyms

AAPO	All Amhara People s Organization (Ethiopia)
AF/E	US Department of State East African Affairs
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania)
CDR	Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (Rwanda)
CNDD	Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie (Burundi)
CZSC	Zairian Contingent for Security in the Camps (Zaire)
DEU	Donor Election Unit (Ethiopia)
EDAG	Ethiopian Democratic Action Group
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPDM	Ethiopian People s Democratic Movement
EPLF	Eritrean People s Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERD	Emergency Relief Desk (Sudan)
ERGADA	Somali Peace and Consultation Committee
ESDL	Ethiopian Somali Democratic League
FAR	Forces Armees du Rwanda
FDD	Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (Burundi)
FORD/K	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Kenya)
FRELIMO	Frente de Liberação de Moçambique
FRODEBU	Front pour la Democratie au Burundi
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (Djibouti)
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
GOS	Government of Sudan
GPDO	Gideo People s Democratic Organization (Ethiopia)
IFLO	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (Ethiopia)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERAHAMWE	"We fight together" — Rwandan militia
IPK	Islamic Party of Kenya

KANU	Kenya African National Union
LRA	Lord s Resistance Army (Sudan)
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MLLT	Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (Ethiopia)
MNRD	Mouvement National pour la Revolution et le Developpement (Rwanda)
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NDA	National Democratic Alliance (Sudan)
NDA	National Democratic Army (Uganda)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIF	National Islamic Front (Sudan)
NLC	National Liberation Council (Sudan)
NRA	National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NRM	National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
ONLF	Ogadeni National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization (Ethiopia)
ORERWA	Organisation pour le Retour au Rwanda
PALIPEHUTU	Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu (Burundi)
PDF	Popular Defense Forces
PFDJ	People s Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea)
RDR	Rassemblement pour la Democratie au Rwanda
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique
RRA	Rahanweyne Resistance Army
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM	Radio/Television Libre des Mille Collines (Rwanda)
SAF	Sudan Allied Forces
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNF	Somali National Front

SNM	Somali National Movement
SPLA	Sudan People s Liberation Army
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSIA	South Sudan Independence Army
SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
TPLF	Tigrayan People s Liberation Front (Ethiopia)
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITAF	United Nations International Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UPRONA	Union pour le Progres National (Burundi)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Conference
USCR	United States Committee for Refugees
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front (Sudan)

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